

SAACID



Economic Recovery Programme

March – August 2003

SAACID conducted an Economic Recovery Programme in partnership with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Italian Government in Mogadishu, between 1 March and 12 August 2003. The programme was implemented as a pilot to provide proof-of-concept to the international community to highlight the fact that complex programming could be carried out in the current anarchic environment in Mogadishu City.

The Programme targeted cleaning up garbage and sand from the streets of Mogadishu in 6 of the 16 districts of the city. The programme employed 600 of the poorest Somalis in the 6-targeted districts for 13 weeks in the designated period (50% women and 50% men). The rest of the programme timeframe was allocated to preparing for the initiative and preparing and submitting final reports, conducting final inventory and debriefing employees, contractors, community leaders and staff. The idea was to utilise a labour intensive format to the work, so that the economic benefits of the programme could be as widely distributed as possible.

We consider the programme to be innovative for the Mogadishu context - partnering community leaders from divided districts and between divided districts of Mogadishu City. Remember that Somalia has had no functioning government since January 1991. The city is fractured into a myriad of clan identities, with only a shadow of district and city identity remaining. Free-lance militias roam freely and have claimed to 'own' the garbage when previous attempts to clear garbage have been initiated. This programme utilised a bottom-up approach to achieving outputs. By empowering local community leaders to select the workers from within each targeted district (against set criteria) and manage the workforce to achieve the agreed outputs, the community came to see the programme as their own.

Problems with local militia groups were solved through dialogue - primarily between the community leaders and the militia. SAACID provided a consultative, monitoring and reporting role. ILO provided financial inputs (from the Italian Government), technical assistance, logistical assistance, and liaison with the Italian Government. We have to say that the ILO was the best partner we've ever had. The vision of the head of their mission in Somalia (Joe Connolly) had great synergy with our own.

Objectives of the programme included:

- Clear garbage that had built up in the city over the past decade – thus enhancing health and hygiene
- Clear sand from the roads of the city, which has been left to pile up over the past decade, making travel within much of the city an arduous task. Mogadishu is a coastal

city and north-easterly and the north-westerly monsoon winds ensure that large amounts of sand are regularly deposited onto the city.

- Provide 600 labouring jobs for the poorest in the city @ US \$2 per day. This economic input was to target the poorest in Mogadishu society and to stimulate economic activity within the city through secondary spending.
- Provide the people of the city with a modicum of hope that the international community had not abandoned them. Many people within the city had given up all hope that anybody cared what happened to them. This desperation manifests itself in ongoing violence on the streets of the city and a population that is both brutalised and brutal.
- Begin the development and empowerment of local governance structures in the city of Mogadishu. Such local structures have existed throughout the past decade, but have been completely ignored by both the international community and Somali factional leaders. The result has been that grassroots leadership has languished in the debris of the city and this potentially effective management and leadership tool has also been left to rot.
- Provide civil society in the city with alternative forms of identity to that of narrow clan interest. The notion of district and city identity was very strong before the collapse of the government in 1991. Social movement in the city before the collapse of government was limited and local identity was very strong. One of the objectives of the programme was to see if this broader civil identity could be revitalised - and in the process see if divisions between different clan groupings could be critically contested. If revitalisation - through alternative forms of social formation - could take place, then social divisions within districts of the city and between districts in the city could begin to be healed and people and clan units could reintegrate themselves into larger social formations that had a broader and more sustainable social agenda to that of narrow and destructive individual and clan interest.

SAACID also had the following ancillary goals it wished to achieve:

- Provide a model for effective indigenous and decentralised intervention in a war-torn society
- Provide female role models amongst communities within Somalia, through the employment of Somali women; and, through effective programme administration by a Somali women's NGO (SAACID is a women's NGO)
- Provide the international community with ongoing evidence that local Somali NGOs have the capacity, probity and desire to fulfil substantive and sustainable programming for the Somali people in a difficult war-torn context
- Prove that different clan formations would and could work together to achieve goals for the greater good of the whole city

A key component to effectively implementing the programme was to garner genuine community support and community ownership of the programme.

This was initiated in March 2003 through a 6-day workshop that walked all key leaders from the 16 districts of Mogadishu through the proposed structure of the programme, its goals and the criteria for selecting the participants who would carry out the bulk of the labour.

The local leaders provided critical input into how such a process would be initiated, implemented and sustained in an ongoing anarchic environment. By taking ownership of the programme (this was practically done through individual district contracts), the grassroots

leadership in Mogadishu ensured strong neighbourhood support in each of the participating 6 districts; and strong support from the other 10 non-participating districts – through a desire for the success of the programme, so that they might have the opportunity in the future to participate in any extended version of such a programme.

All district leaders agreed that they would work together for the success of the programme, so that they could show the international community that programming could be effectively implemented in Mogadishu - despite the current anarchy - and that they could be trusted with further programming in the future.

There was also universal agreement that the poorest in each community should be targeted; and that this conformed well to the core precepts of Islam.

Criteria for labour selection were discussed and agreed upon:

- Must be at least 18 years of age
- Must be unemployed
- Must have gender equity (50% men and 50% women)
- Only one member from a family can be employed
- Must live in the district where the work is to be carried out
- There should be no age barrier – as long as the participant is able-bodied and willing to work
- Must agree to work 7 hours per day, 6 days per week (Friday being a holiday)
- All participants would take instruction from the relevant local contracting agents – the head being the District Commissioner in each district
- The leaders categorised the poor in Mogadishu into 3 sub-categories:
 - a) The poor
 - b) The very poor
 - c) The poorest

It was agreed that a minimum of 50% of the participants in each district would come from ‘the poorest’ category. The other 50% would come from the other 2 identified categories. While no definitional provision was made for each of these categories, it was understood by all present what was meant by each category. There was a local cultural understanding of the definitions discussed.

Activities for the first month – 19 April – 15 May 2003

In the first four weeks of activities there was widespread curiosity and exhilaration amongst the public and local elite. SAACID received a number of letters of support (this is not normal for Somalis, usually they write letters of complaint) from different notable figures within Mogadishu society and several from different groups.

There were 6 worksite accidents – 2 of which were relatively serious. Both individuals have fully recovered. Overall, SAACID believes that the number of total accidents was under-reported during the first month. We make this assumption when the first month’s figures are compared to the other 2 months (see Accidents and Incidents Chart) - after monitoring activities were enhanced through extra training and through the hiring of specialist first aid workers.

Another real highlight was how smooth the payment process was implemented. Payment was on a weekly basis, and the participants and district leaders received a lot of comfort from the fact that they were regularly and correctly paid.

Six rifle grenades in good condition were found in the garbage in the first month. These grenades had been stolen from a local warlord; and were quickly recovered by the warlord when the information about their discovery was circulated throughout the city.

There were problems that plagued the district leaders and SAACID for the first month, and these primarily related to the lack of opportunity for people to participate in the programme:

- Many people gathered daily looking for employment at the work sites. This disrupted the work pattern, as the supervisors were constantly engaged in explaining the reasons why more people could not be employed.
- District leaders constantly requested an immediate expansion of the programme to all 16 districts, due to huge pressure from their consistencies.
- District leaders constantly requested the number of participants in each district be raised to 200-300, due to huge pressure from their consistencies.
- Many request letters came to SAACID requesting an expansion of the programme to all 16 districts of Mogadishu; and to surrounding regions – such as Hiiran Region, Middle Shabelle Region and Lower Shabelle Region.
- There were also other problems that were encountered, but were not anticipated in the planning stage:
- The local tools were not of a good enough quality to withstand constant daily usage. Many wore out within the first month. A formal request by SAACID to ILO to source supplementary tools in Nairobi was made and granted.
- Vehicle logistics to facilitate effective monitoring and supervision were inadequate. SAACID formally requested a revision of this to ILO and received full ILO support.
- Much of the garbage had compacted over time and was extremely difficult to break down with hand tools. SAACID requested that a bulldozer be hired to break up these more difficult piles. ILO granted this request.
- The garbage quickly piled up at the dumpsites. A request was made for the provision of a bulldozer to flatten these piles so more refuse could be effectively dumped at the sites. ILO agreed to this request.
- There was a need for safety equipment for the workers. A formal request was made by SAACID for safety equipment and received full endorsement and an immediate response from ILO.

A number of formal meetings were also held throughout the month with the DC's, supervisors and monitors, so that information could be shared and problems discussed and solved.

Activities for the second month – 16 May – 12 June 2003

By the beginning of the second month of activities SAACID was comfortable with the core elements of the process of the large-scale work activities and felt that it was in a position to concentrate on procedures relating to attendance, haulage (and haulage outputs) and outputs per 'man-day'.

The local radio stations, newspapers and TV stations continued to provide daily coverage of the programme. All were very supportive; and this support was magnified by the overwhelming public support throughout the city.

Many prominent local personalities continued to speak out in support of the programme; and many others telephoned SAACID to express their personal support for the ILO initiative.

During the month, meetings were held with the DC's, supervisors and monitors to discuss how the procedures for attendance, hauliers and outputs could be put onto a more transparent and sustainable level.

Also discussed was:

- Payment scheduling;
- The increasing strength of the Somali Shilling and its impact on real wages;
- The increased productivity from the new tools from Nairobi;
- The hiring of 2 nurse-qualified health workers for each district and the impact on morale;
- The ongoing problem of not having any specialist munitions experts to safely dispose of old munitions found in the garbage;
- The purchase of two water containers for each district for drinking and washing;
- The need for a fulltime bulldozer;
- The increased number of incidents;
- The increased number of reported accidents on the worksites;
- Nametags were produced to stop 'ghost workers' and the switching of workers by district officials – that was leading to conflict amongst some participants over apportioned wages;
- It was accepted that the participants had the right to 20 minutes at lunchtime for prayer and for something to eat and drink; and,

Water containers for drinking and washing would be purchased and placed at each worksite. The districts would contribute to the cost of water each day.

Two SAACID monitors would be posted in each district; and they would randomly check all individuals throughout the day for attendance. Each individual would be checked an average of three times each day. Failure to meet one rollcall would result in the loss of a half a day's wages. The failure to meet two rollcalls would result in the loss of the full day's wages. Continuous absence without reason would result in expulsion from the programme. These conditions also applied to supervisors and salaried DC's.

It was agreed by all districts and SAACID managers to adjust the payment period from weekly to fortnightly to reduce the strain on SAACID's logistical capacity. It also provided for increased productivity because 3 hours were being lost each week so that participants could go to the designated pay site to be paid.

Two water containers were purchased for each district for the participants for drinking and washing. This was much appreciated by all participants and the participating districts agreed to provide water for these containers each day as their contribution.

The increasing number and quality of the new tools purchased in Nairobi had a dramatic impact on productivity outputs – with increases exceeding 100% in several districts.

There was ongoing concern that the programme was not adequately providing a duty-of-care for the participants in relation to the possibility of unexploded munitions. SAACID indicated that ILO continued negotiations with several INGOs to bring an expert team from Somaliland to deal with any unexploded ordnance and to provide a capacity for educating participants and the wider community on good ordnance protection measures – especially for children.

Two health workers, who were qualified nurses, were hired locally in each district by the local authorities. These health workers had an immediate and positive impact on the morale of the workforce; and this impact remained for the remainder of the programme. As a result of the health workers being onsite all the time the quality of the reporting of accidents dramatically increased. SAACID is very confident that after the instalment of the health workers, reporting of accidents was done with 100% accuracy - as to quantity and severity.

The overall mood of the public in the city throughout the programme was positive in the extreme. Yet, the second month saw a huge increase in free-lance militia activity at the worksites attempting to extort money from the participants; and more directly, from the district officials and SAACID. SAACID cannot quantify the exact reasons for the timing and scale of the incidents, but we could identify some causal events:

- Local skirmishing that co-incidentally occurred near worksites
- Increased awareness amongst the wider public (particularly free-lance militias) that this was a potential node for extorting money
- Increased local business awareness and coordination amongst each other and with free-lance militias to attempt to extort money
- Manifestations of the ongoing peace-process in Nairobi, Kenya – as the process ebbed and flowed in favour of one faction and then another

The total number of incidents for the month was reported as 30. Twenty-nine were with free-lance militia and one was a snake that scared the workers from a worksite until it was killed.

The level of reporting worksite accidents also dramatically increased compared to the first month. This was primarily due to the hiring of dedicated health workers for each district. The number of accidents reports for the second month for all 6 districts was 21 – with one of those accidents being serious. A male was stabbed in the eye by a thorn of a cactus tree. He was immediately taken to hospital. He has recovered steadily since the accident, with the supervision of appropriate antibiotics by local physicians. He still has a little white haze on the skin of the eye, but doctors are very hopeful of a full recovery. His current vision is estimated at 90% of what it was before the accident.

Activities for the third month – 14 June – 17 July 2003

The third month of the programme continued the strong support shown from the public in Mogadishu and from the different media that operate in the city. Prominent personalities in Mogadishu continued to come to the worksites and SAACID offices to express their public and private support.

The media were exceptionally supportive - providing daily coverage of different aspects of the programme; and have continuously derided the opportunistic free-lance militia groups that have attempted to disrupt the work sites.

This month was highlighted by the smooth running of all elements of the programme. Attendance and productivity were high. The number of incidents that plagued the programme in the second month dropped dramatically, as it became obvious to the militias and business leaders that their extortion attempts were failing; and because of the broader civil society support that saw the district officials, plus elders, sheikhs and other grassroots leaders come out to the worksites to talk and shame the militiamen into submission. The last month of activities really cemented public support for the programme and it was obvious that a continuation of the programme would have seen the virtual elimination of extortion attempts by free-lance militias on the worksites.

Meetings with the DC's, supervisors and monitors had become routine – in so far as the primary issue talked about was productivity outputs, and how to continue to get greater productivity gains out of the workforce. Issues relating to process were largely resolved.

1-day of health and hygiene workshop for each district

A 1-day health workshop was held for the 100 participants in each district. The subject matter covered in each workshop was as follows:

- General health and hygiene
- Personal hygiene
- Food and water hygiene
- Environmental hygiene
- Definition of a STD (sexually transmitted disease)
- Factors influencing the frequency of STDs
- Obstacles to STD control
- What is TB?
- What causes the TB infection?
- How does the TB infection spread?
- The magnitude of TB as a health problem in Somalia
- What is HIV/AIDS?
- What causes HIV/AIDS?
- How the disease is contracted and transmitted
- Prevention of HIV/AIDS
- HIV/AIDS diagnosis and its symptoms
- Who are the risk groups?
- What is of FGM (female genital mutilation) and the types of FGM?
- The consequences of FGM
- Alternatives for FGM

The workshops were an outstanding success, with the trainers reporting a high degree of information transmission - which was confirmed in a final group question and answer session.

2-day clean-up of area used for the Somali Independence Day celebration by all 600 participants

This special work programme was instigated and implemented by all district officials – including those not participating directly in the programme. The purpose of the activity was to clear the area that would be used to celebrate Somalia's Independence Day. It was extremely successful in its primary objective of cleaning the area that would be used for the celebration activities. It was even more successful in conveying a very positive message to the public in Mogadishu (through all the media services) of working together for common goals and common unity. The public response was outstanding, with virtual unanimous support for this symbol of Somali unity that transcended narrow clan and individual interest.

Munitions capacity

There was ongoing debate and criticism of SAACID and the ILO by the DC's for not implementing a genuine capacity for the safe disposal for munitions found in the garbage. In the third month of activities an old and badly decomposed 120 mm mortar was found in the garbage. There were no procedures in place to deal with the explosive, and the participants unwisely handled the explosive in a carefree manner that indicated a basic lack of education in munitions awareness.

The DC's again urged SAACID and the ILO to develop a capacity for safe munitions disposal and to develop a capacity for educating the public on the dangers of handling munitions.

Impact on reintegration of divided communities within a district and between districts

An enormous amount of discussion has taken place in the public arena in Mogadishu over the last 3 months of activities on the positive impact the programme has had on reintegrating divided communities within districts; and building greater trust between districts.

This aspect of the programme exceeded all expectations! SAACID could never have imagined how such a simple programme could galvanise the whole of Mogadishu. By getting people from different clans to work together in one district; and by getting the coordination mechanisms in place and genuinely operational between districts has made for the best practical confidence-building measures. The level of trust between previously discordant clan groups has markedly improved. This programme has provided a practical catalyst for the average person, who has been yearning for peace and stability for many years, to publicly express their support for a broader practical peace effort.

District leaders and citizens continuously vocalised their support for the programme and spontaneously initiated their own activities that added great value to the initial programme. This support really materialised in the last month of activities – where a noticeable reduction in incidents at the worksites provides an accurate indicator of the effectiveness of the 'add-on' local activities that were initiated at the local level.

The impact of the programme on urban renewal

Another existential indicator of the success of the programme at the local level is the redevelopment of sites that have been cleared of garbage and roads that have been cleared of sand.

Looted and bombed out buildings were rehabilitated and small business activities sprang up in those areas – reflecting increased economic and security confidence in those areas. Some local communities dug pits to ensure that all new garbage was disposed of in a more hygienic manner. Several areas were turned into local markets. Other areas had generator lighting installed by local businessmen to protect the areas against night-time dumping.

The programme provided a strong catalyst for renewed civic pride, and allowed local residents to renew their identity in their district and their city. For the average Mogadishu resident, who is totally powerless in the face of the ongoing anarchy, this provided significant respite to the hopelessness of their daily lives and provided genuine optimism for their future – and the future of their families. This is signified in the renewed economic investment in their local communities and district.

The positive impact on individual self-worth

Discussions with local leaders highlighted the overwhelmingly positive impact the programme had on the participants of the programme.

It was noted that the dignity from decent work for the poorest in the community gave these poor a substantially increased sense of self-worth. Not only could they effectively provide for their family, but also they could also effectively contribute to the health, hygiene and cleanliness of their local community and city.

The DC's indicated that the local communities now looked at the individuals with increased respect and this translated itself into increased productivity at the worksites.

Payment process

The district leaders congratulated SAACID for the efficiency and professionalism of the payment process throughout the programme. This aspect of the programme was flawless, with no complaints being registered.

SAACID also tracked the participants to see if they have had any problems with theft, looting or extortion from anybody after they received their wages and left the payment areas – no such negative reports were received.

Garbage and sand output

SAACID had no capacity to calculate output (in terms of tonnage) – ILO delegated this activity to an independent engineer. Capacity outputs need to be referred to his report.

SAACID and the district officials, supervisors and monitors had continuing discussions on how to increase productivity and outputs.

Key observations revolved around:

- Strict monitoring of attendance
- Strict monitoring of hauliers at both the work and dump sites
- The quality of tools used

- The quality of the payment process
- The investment in safety equipment and first aid capacity
- The investment in water containers for drinking and cleaning

All agreed it that an enormous amount of garbage and sand was cleared from the 6 districts over the 3 months. All district leaders were happy with the outputs they were able to achieve.

All district leaders were also extremely happy with the increased road access in their districts due to the level of sand and detritus removal (particularly car bodies) from the streets.

Accidents and incidents

Both SAACID and the district leaders were very happy with the quantitative reduction in the number of incidents in the third month of activities (see chart). All parties were extremely happy with the level of public support that translated into increasing community action against free-lance militias in their local area. If the programme had continued SAACID believes that it may have been possible to get to a point where public action could have coalesced to a point where further programming targeted at militias could have resulted in an overall reduction in gun crime in the city.

The number of accidents reported for the third month of activities remained relatively high. This was primarily due to the excellent level of reporting from the specialist health workers. Only one serious accident occurred in the third month of activities. A woman had a small stone lodged in her eye. She was taken to a hospital where the stone was successfully removed. She has made a full recovery, with no long-term effects to her vision.

The weakness for the programme on the worksites in regard to the number of worksite accidents relates directly to the lack of effective work boots for the participants. Virtually all the accidents recorded in the third month were foot injuries – either from sharp objects in the garbage or from tools hitting the participant's feet. This issue could not be resolved with ILO due to budget constraints.

Fact Sheets

SAACID perceived the programme as an opportunity to survey the poorest in Mogadishu on a variety of subjects.

SAACID attempted to collect this data early in the second month of programme by interviewing participants at the worksites. Freelance militias perceived this process as indicating that the participants were receiving cash at the worksites and it caused work disruptions. SAACID then decided to suspend collection at worksites and instead collected the data at the more secure pay-sites.

SAACID believes the data collected provides a unique insight into the poor of Mogadishu. A separate report that contained the results of the fact sheet survey was developed and submitted to ILO in the third month of activities.

Highlights of the survey are cited below:

- Women took the majority of the working position in the programme (62.83%). One of the criteria for the programme was that all districts had to have a minimum of 50% women employed on site. SAACID further lobbied for as many positions as possible to go to women, because SAACID is a women's NGO and because SAACID believes that, as a generalisation, Somali women are more responsible with money than Somali men. Another factor that led to the high percentage of women being selected was that many Somali men were not prepared to work collecting garbage and cleaning the streets.
- Only one district failed to comply with the minimum 50% women criteria, and that was Bondhere District (48 women). There were mitigating circumstances here, as Bondhere is badly divided within the district along clan lines and it was very difficult for them to come up with a list of 100 people that all agreed upon. Through the implementation of the programme, trust and relationships have strengthened greatly in the district and in any extension programme this issue will not arise again.
- The average age of the participants in the programme was 36 and a half.
- All participants indicated that they were unemployed before the programme began.
- 38.83% of the participants indicated that they were Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
- The average monthly income for the families of the participants was US \$15.25 – not including the income generated from this programme.
- The average number of family members living with each of the participants was 9.45.
- The average number of children that were alive for each married participant was 7.62.
- The average number of children that were born, but since, for any number of reasons have died, was 2.19 per married participant.
- The percentage of children that have died to married participants was 28.76%.
- 50.33% of the participants indicated that they had no education at all. When surveyed by sex, 62.33% of female participants indicated that they had no education at all. While 30.04% of male participants indicated that they had no education at all.
- Only 35.28% of the women indicated they could read and write - this was compared to 72.96% of the men.
- Only 20.69% of the women indicated they could add, subtract, divide and multiply - this was compared to 54.07% of the men.
- Interestingly, 49.34% of the women were married compared to 77.13% of the men on the programme. 19.89% of the women indicated that they were divorced, while only 6.28% of the men said they were currently divorced. 19.36% of the women indicated that they were widowed, while only 1.79% of the men indicated that they were in that category.
- 66.33% of the participants who had married indicated that they had divorced at least once. 33.67% of the participants indicated that they had married but had never divorced. Of those, 39.26% of the women indicated they had never divorced, while 24.22% of the men said that they had never divorced.
- 30.17% of the participants indicated that they had no previous job experience at all. Of those, 35.28% of the women indicated that they had no experience at all, while 21.52% of the men indicated that they had no previous job experience.
- 48.33% of all participants indicated they thought that Somali women did have access to legal rights through Sharia or Islamic law. 42.17% of the participants indicated that they did not think that Somali women had access to any law at the present time.
- 63.68% of the men surveyed agreed with the statement that Somali women had access to their legal rights through the Sharia or Islamic system. While only 39.26% of the

women surveyed indicated that they thought they had access through the Sharia or Islamic system.

- 54.38% of the women surveyed indicated that they did not think they had access to any legal system at the present time. 24.21% of the men surveyed indicated that they thought Somali women did not have access to legal rights at this point in time.
- 63.33% of the participants indicated that they had no health problems. 36.67% of participants indicated that they had at least one medical problem. 14.83% of the participants indicated they had varying levels of malnutrition. 9.67% of the participants indicated that they were currently suffering from malaria. 4.83% of the participants indicated that they currently had a Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD).
- 62.5% of participants indicated that their families had no health problems. When comparing the data to the list of indicated personal health problems, it is clear that there is under-reporting of family health problems. The data is valuable in that it indicates the types of health issues facing the poor in Mogadishu.
- More than 70% of men and women indicated that there was an immediate need for medical care for themselves or their family members. 25% of the participants indicated that they had never been to a doctor. That figure was comprised of 29.44% of the female participants and 17.49% of the male participants. The main factor cited for not seeking medical attention was economic constraints. Another 27.5% of the participants indicated that they had sort medical attention in the life of the programme.
- Interestingly, 66.58% of the female participants indicated that a female was the primary healthcare provider for the family, while 57.85% of the male participants indicated that a male was the primary healthcare provider for the family.
- 55.17% of the participants indicated that they did not have an understanding of what HIV/AIDS was. 61.27% of the female participants indicated that they were unaware of what HIV/AIDS was and 44.84% of the male participants indicated that they were unaware of what HIV/AIDS was.
- 6.67% of the participants indicated that they were aware of someone with HIV/AIDS - a significant increase over a 1998 survey result that SAACID carried out (2.3%). Of those that did indicate knowledge of someone with the disease, 11.21% of the male participants indicated the awareness of someone they knew, while only 3.98% of the female respondents indicated a similar awareness.
- 53.33% of the participants indicated that they had no idea of the measures that could prevent HIV/AIDS. Another 31.5% of the participants indicated that HIV/AIDS could be prevented by not having sex outside marriage.
- Only 16 of the 600 participants indicated gun ownership. The low rate of ownership can be related to the level of relative poverty.

Outputs

- Successful employment of 600 poor people in Mogadishu (100 per district) for 13 weeks @ US \$2 per day
- The provision of 46,800 labour days for the three month programme
- Garbage clearance in 6 Mogadishu districts for 3 months
- Sand clearance from roads in 6 districts for 3 months
- Successfully sub-contracted labour contracts to 6 local district authorities
- Successfully sub-contracted haulage contracts to truck contractors in each district
- Successfully tendered and contracted for local provision of tools
- Employed 2 specialist first aid workers in each participating district

- Health and hygiene education for 600 participants
- Empowerment of local district authorities
- Peace building and reintegration in divided districts and between districts

18 July – 12 August 2003

In this period the primary activities were the collection and audit of tools from the district partners and the final closing ceremony.

The tool audit was done through the last two weeks of August. The results of this audit were submitted to ILO in a separate report.

In the beginning of August, SAACID prepared the closing ceremony for the programme. ILO was unable to be present for the ceremony, which all the local Somali leaders were disappointed about. The ceremony was held on 12 August and was very successful – with all the local media covering the event.

Monitoring and Assessment

SAACID was responsible for the monitoring, assessment and disbursement of programme funding.

SAACID continuously monitored all aspects of the programme. Two monitors were hired for each district to monitor and assess attendance, productivity, hauliers and the constraints faced. These monitors also provided limited communication between the worksites and SAACID officers so that incidents and serious accidents could be responded to in a timely manner. A further 2 monitors were placed in each of the dumpsites to monitor the hauliers and to ensure that dumping occurred at the designated dumpsites.

SAACID also ensured:

- The proper organisation of the worksites;
- Strict compliance of the workers with the agreed working regulations;
- The timely and correct payment of wages;
- The levelling of dumpsites to ensure continued access to all sites;
- The use of bulldozers to break-up compacted garbage;
- Coordination of activities between districts;
- Chaired meeting for district leaders, supervisors, and monitors;
- Effective liaison with ILO in Nairobi;
- Comprehensive photo and video documentation of all elements of the programme;
- Weekly narrative and photographic reports to ILO in Nairobi;
- Comprehensive monthly financial reporting to ILO in Nairobi;
- Instant reporting of serious incidents to ILO in Nairobi that may have an impact on ILO policy toward the programme;
- The development, collection and collation of data from all participants through the use of fact sheets;
- Health and hygiene education for all participants;
- Arbitration for the contracted districts over the methodology used at the worksites.
- The proper maintenance and storage of the tools; and,

- A proper duty of care for all participants.

Impact of the programme

The impact of the programme covered the following areas:

- Garbage reduction in the city – with a concomitant reduction in disease prevalence in the city. SAACID had no capacity to quantify disease reduction. The evidence is anecdotal – through media reporting and discussions with local leaders and community groups.
- Sand and detritus clearance from the streets of Mogadishu, resulting in better traffic access within the 6 targeted districts.
- ‘Beautification’ of the city in the targeted 6 districts – through unsightly garbage reduction and sand clearance.
- Education and awareness of the health problems caused by the uncontrolled dumping garbage in the city’s precincts. All districts involved in the programme have implemented measures (digging garbage pits, roping off cleared areas, introducing generator street lighting, etc) to keep cleared areas clean and to maintain a level of community awareness and civic pride.
- Reintegration within districts has been extremely successful. By providing a catalyst for people to come together from divided communities within a district and work for common goals has provided a fillip for community reintegration and has renewed largely redundant district identity and pride.
- Reintegration between districts has also been successful, but limited to supporting the current programme through meetings and public advocacy. Any extension of the programme should see a permanent local ‘council’ of some description developed where district leaders could canvass and develop their own work plans for other needy areas of rehabilitation and community service delivery in Mogadishu – for example, in sewerage, rehabilitation of public buildings for public use, etc.
- Urban renewal was an unexpected multiplier for the programme. As areas that were derelict and abandoned were cleaned, the local communities began to rehabilitate buildings for business and for use as domiciles. Further, local micro businesses sprang up on the streets and new markets were developed. The programme thus manifested unexpected secondary economic growth and acted as a local business stimulant in the targeted districts.
- Overwhelming public support for programming that targets the grassroots communities fairly and provides services to the city of Mogadishu.
- Provision of 600 labouring jobs @ US \$2 per day. The 3-month programme provided each participant with US \$156 in labour wages. When comparing this to the US \$15.25 average per month that their family (average size was 9.46 people per family) received from other sources, the programme provided each participant with the equivalent of 85% of the family’s traditional annual income.
- Secondary economic stimulus was also generated through the wage expenditure of the participants in the programme. They were able to buy more food, clothing and services – such as healthcare and education for their children.
- SAACID believes that the economic inputs from the programme, at least in part, drove the Somali Shilling to greater strength. This had a negative impact on the participants and the poor in the city, as there was a lag between the strengthening in the Somali currency and a reduction of prices in the markets. In fact, SAACID saw no reduction in market prices in the life of the programme despite the strengthened Somali Shilling.

As the participants were only allowed to receive their wages in Somali Shillings the effect was to reduce their real wages over the course of the programme.

Lessons learned/Recommendations

SAACID recommends the following:

- A 1-year extension of the programme to incorporate all 16 districts of Mogadishu.
- A minimum of 100 poor people to be employed in each district for a period of 3 months (the district leaders continue to request a minimum of 200-300 people per district). A new 100 people would be employed in each quarter of the programme.
- Activities should include garbage and sand clearance and the patching of road surfaces to further improve road access.
- Individuals should be paid US \$2 per day – or the Somali equivalent – depending on current exchange rates. The programme should be flexible on this point to ensure that the participants are receiving the best value for their labour.
- Haulage contracts should be based on outputs (the number of trips) – not a flat rate per month.
- The employment of first aid workers in all districts.
- The need for safety equipment. SAACID would also recommend the need for appropriate footwear if any extension programme could afford this cost, which would have to be paid to a new set of 1,600 workers every three months.
- The need for a munitions specialist team that would have the capacity to safely dispose of munitions found in garbage; as well as providing an education programme to the broad public on munitions education.
- The need to provide clean drinking and washing water to all work sites.
- A strong logistical element needs to be actuated to ensure that problem solving is timely and efficient to truncate potential problems at worksites.
- Better communications needs to be developed between worksites and SAACID central office so that problems can be dealt with in a timely and efficient manner.
- Tools should be sourced through a combination of local and international sources, so as to ensure the necessary quality to carry out long-term labour-intensive activities.
- A strong education and media element should be included to harness the prevailing strong public support and channel it in a much more structured and focussed manner. The education should provide broad public education and leadership in all media in health, hygiene, civics (the role of local government and the need to develop sustainable not-for-profit public services), discussion on reintegration and reconciliation in Mogadishu and discussion on possible strategies to eliminate or mitigate public displays of weapons in the city.
- Much better technical support needs to be provided to the programme. SAACID suggests the need for a team of qualified independent engineers to map garbage and road worksites; and to map outputs and timelines. This also provides another layer of independent verification of work productivity and output.
- The formal development of a local ‘council’ that would act as a node for liaison between the city of Mogadishu and the international community. This leadership body would also take a lead in public discussion about sustainable not-for-profit public service delivery and what form it would take. This would be the first phase in developing a debate on a ‘participatory budgeting’ approach to local government in Mogadishu City.