

SAACID



TRACER SURVEY FOR THE DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME (DDR) IMPLEMENTED FOR 512 PARTICIPANTS IN MOGADISHU IN 2005-7

**Conducted July-October 2008
Final Report: December 2008**

Background

A demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme (DDR) was implemented over 14 months (December 2005 – January 2007) in Mogadishu City for 512 militiamen from all 16 districts of the city. This was the second voluntary weapon's destruction programme conducted in Mogadishu City - both by SAACID in partnership with UNDP – and the third overall implemented by SAACID¹.

Funding for the programme was provided by UNDP; and the programme was implemented by SAACID. The programme was broken into 3 core elements, as follows:

The first was a 1-month prefatory and mobilisation period. In this period the local leaders in each targeted district were mobilised and the programme outlined so that they could provide effective input and partnership. This was also the month for the collection of one fully functioning automatic light, medium or heavy machinegun from each participant.

The second element was 3-months of literacy, numeracy, health and civics education (Literacy and Numeracy Training - LNT). This component was conducted every afternoon for 4 hours at SAACID's primary, secondary and vocational school in the Shibis District of Mogadishu.

The third component was either 2-months of business training and 6-months of phased micro-grants for business activities²; or 10 months of vocational training in a skill of the participant's choice³.

All 127 BPP participants completing 2 months of business training in:

¹ The first was conducted in partnership with UNESCO – though with no weapon's destruction component.

² Business Principals and Practices stream – BPP

³ Vocational Enterprise Business Training stream – VEBT

1. Business Theory
2. Business Plan Development
3. Marketing
4. Basic Bookkeeping
5. Applied Mathematics
6. Cooperatives

All participants were then provided with the first tranche of a 3-tranche micro-grant rollout⁴, for start-up capital that was to be spent against their business plan. SAACID randomly monitored these businesses on a daily basis, and provided support for business plan modification as participants encountered problems and constraints. At 2-month intervals, SAACID provided the remaining 2 tranches for those continuing to develop their business⁵.

All VEBT participants had chosen which areas they would like to train in, and they were then distributed to indigenous host training sites based on those preferences. All host trainers were voluntary private businesses. VEBT participants also attended entrepreneurship classes for the last 2-months of their 10-month vocational training course⁶.

Five hundred and five of the 512 militiamen selected for the programme completed all elements of the programme. Of the 7 that did not complete, 5 left the country and stray bullets killed 2 as they were travelling to or from their training venues.

Eighteen months after the completion of the programme, UNDP provided funding to conduct a tracer survey of the programme participants. Ninety-eight participants could not be located for the survey. SAACID's survey staff believe that a majority of these participants had left the country in search of opportunities elsewhere.

Context

The programme was designed and initiated in a prevailing context of warlordism in the city of Mogadishu. There were no overarching security or governance structures; though the warlord patchwork had been long well established, and, while an overall high degree of lawlessness prevailed, there was a high degree of predictability prevailing within the city.

In May 2007, after a couple of months of significant conflict between the well-established warlords and an emerging network of Islamic courts⁷, the warlords were defeated and driven from the city. The UIC were militarily very strong, but politically quite weak. The UIC ushered in a high degree of relative safety for the city; and this was highly appreciated by the population as a whole. The UIC transition did not affect the DDR programme and its implementation at all.

In December 2007, the UIC fled from the city in the face of an Ethiopia invasion. The Ethiopians installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the city. The TFG had been formed with the help of IGAD and the EC in August 2004. The transition to the TFG did not effect the implementation and completion of the DDR programme directly (in January 2007); but emerging opposition and insecurity to the Ethiopian occupation and the TFG did

⁴ Tranche amounts were US \$200, \$150, and \$90

⁵ See annexes 1 and 2 for BPP choices and survey tracking impact of micro-grant stream

⁶ See annexes 3 and 4 for exit surveys on VEBT participants and the local trainers.

⁷ Union of Islamic Courts – UIC

prevent the final closing ceremony, in which all 512 light, medium and heavy machineguns were to be publicly destroyed.

It needs to be noted that from the beginning of 2007, SAACID continued to receive increasing numbers of implicit and overt threats to hand over the weapons to various actors within the TFG. After a particularly strong overt threat on 26 April, SAACID decided on an emergency destruction of all weapons. From 26-30 April, SAACID destroyed all weapons. All weapons were photographed and videoed while being destroyed. Some 9 DVDs of that destruction process were provided to UNDP.

SAACID stored the weapon parts – along with the weapon parts from the previous UNDP/SAACID DDR programme – in the armoury. SAACID's idea was to create a peace monument out of the weapon parts.

On 18 June 2007, The Ethiopian military and TFG militia invaded SAACID's compound, imprisoned 3 staff and SAACID's Country Director on charges of being Al Qaida terrorists. The Ethiopians and TFG militiamen broke into SAACID's safe and the armoury, and took all the weapon parts to an unknown destination. They also looted or destroyed computers and administrative equipment totalling about US \$28,000.

So, from January 2007, opposition to occupation grew steadily. In March and April 2007, the Ethiopian military conducted major military operation within the city to destroy the opposition. The Ethiopian order of battle included tanks, helicopters, artillery, rockets and infantry. After several weeks of fighting, the opposition withdrew; as well as about 300,000 displaced civilians.

The months of April through October were characterised by an increasing insurgency again, looting, extortion, rape and murder by all factions, and collective punishment and arbitrary arrest by the TFG. This continues to displace more-and-more civilians from the city.

In October and November of 2007, another major Ethiopian military operation was conducted in the city; and this again mitigated the level of the insurgency; but forced hundreds-of-thousands more civilians to be displaced.

The insurgency again grew from November 2007 to the present. Lawlessness and anarchy have systemically increased – with utter anarchy now prevailing. The level of insecurity now prevailing in Mogadishu City is worse than at any time since the last Somali government fell in January 1991. The Ethiopian military have lost complete control and are completely demoralised; the AU peacekeepers that were brought in to safeguard the port and airport have remained in permanent defensive positions and not provided any security for the population as a whole. The TFG has ceased to exist in any form in the city.

Questions

The core focus for the DDR tracer survey that was developed searched for answers to the following types of questions:

- After 18 months since the programme was completed – during which a full-scale foreign occupation and insurgency had developed - what had happened to the 505 ex-combatants?
- How many had taken up militia work again?
- How many had joined the government or opposition?
- How many had been displaced, fled or been killed?
- How effective was this DDR programme – and its underlying community-based philosophy and methodology – 18 months later – and with a full-scale insurgency raging in the city?


Results – physical location of participants

Of the 505 men who participated in the programme, SAACID was able to positively track the whereabouts of 407 of those men.

Of those 407 men, SAACID found that:

- 67 participants (16.5%) were confirmed to have gone abroad;
- 18 participants (4.4%) were reported to have left - either for other regions in Somalia, or possibly abroad;
- 9 participants (2.2%) were confirmed as dead;
- 1 participant was present but unwilling to be surveyed; and,
- 312 participants (76.9%) were present in Mogadishu and completed the survey

Physical Location of 407 DDR Program Participants



Of those who went abroad, participants' references reported:

- 16 were confirmed to be abroad, but it could not be confirmed in which country they were now residing;
- 17 went to South Africa;
- 7 went to Kenya;
- 6 went to Ethiopia;
- 5 went to Europe;
- 8 went to Libya;
- 1 went to Qatar;
- 3 went to Saudi Arabia;
- 1 went to Uganda; and,
- 3 went to Yemen.

Of those (4% above) who were reported to have gone to other regions of Somalia:

- 13 did not indicate where in Somalia (possibly went abroad);
- 1 went to Bossaso, Puntland;
- 1 went to Hargeisa, Somaliland;
- 2 went to Juba Region; and,
- 1 went to Middle Shabelle.


Considering that 67 participants were reported to have gone abroad and another 18 participants were confirmed to have left Mogadishu (either to go abroad or to other regions of Somalia), in addition to the 98 participants that were unable to be located and also assumed to have left Mogadishu, a total of 183 participants (36.2% of the 505 participants to have completed the programme) had left the city and 9 participants had (1.8%) died. The remaining 313 participants (62%) had remained in Mogadishu despite the ongoing anarchic environment and vigorous insurgency since the completion of the programme in January 2007.

Results - data on 312 participants surveyed

The results that follow are from the 312 remaining ex-militiamen that had agreed to participate in the follow-up tracer survey.


Basic demographic data

Martial Status of Participants




- 44 participants (14%) were divorced;
- 162 participants (52%) were married; and,
- 106 participants (34%) were single.

Age of 312 Participants Surveyed




- 7 participants (2%) are now 18-20 years old;
- 176 participants (56%) are now 21-25 years old;
- 52 participants (17%) are now 26-30 years old;
- 40 participants (13%) are now 31-35 years old;
- 23 participants (7%) are now 36-40 year old;
- 11 participants (4%) are now 41-45 years old; and
- 3 participants (1%) are now 46-50 year old.

Household Size



The average household size of the 312 participants that completed the tracer survey was 7.99 (2,495 people).


Internally Displaced



- 148 participants (48%) reported they are not displaced
- 48 participants (15%) reported being displaced within the last 6 months
- 42 participants (13%) reported being displaced between 6 months to 1 year ago
- 65 participants (21%) reported being displaced for the last 1-2 years
- 9 participants (3%) reported being displaced for more than the last 2 years

Satisfaction with LNT/BPP/VEBT training length

Participants were asked if the training was long enough. One hundred and seventy-four (174) participants (55.8%) said they were satisfied with the length of time for training, One hundred and thirty-six (136) participants (43.6%) said the training was not long enough; and 2 participants (0.6%) said the teachers and trainers were not very good.



This response can be compared to the exit survey that was conducted for all participants in January 2007. For the exit survey, 79 of all participants indicated that they were completely happy with all components of the programme⁸. While 89% of participants indicated that the vocational training (VEBT) and business development elements (BPP) indicated that they were completely happy with those training elements.

The degradation in the level of happiness with the length of training between the end of the programme and now directly relates to current opportunities for employment in the city. The pervasive level of conflict, inflation and criminality - that directly leeches off business activity - has completely bled out economic activity. Unemployment in the city now exceeds 80%. SAACID had expected a much larger percentage of participants to indicate unhappiness with the length of the training programme.


Relationship with trainer

Those surveyed for the tracer study were also asked if they had kept any relationship with their trainer. Some 97 participants (31%) said that they had not; while some 215 participants (69%) said they have kept a relationship with their host trainer. When asked if the trainer still helps the participant when requested, 108 participants (34.6%) said no, while 204 participants (65.4%) said yes.

Maintained Relationship with Trainer



Trainer Still Helps When Requested



The outcome of participant ‘bonding’ with former host trainers is exceptional and vastly above expectations. In the exit survey for host trainers in January 2007, the host trainers indicated that they would be guaranteeing long-term employment for 37% of the ex-militia that had participated in the programme. The realisation that more than 65% of participants continued to have an enduring direct relationship with their former host trainers⁹ highlights the strong advantages in utilising local businesses as an entry point for ex-militiamen to be reintegrated back into civil society.

⁸ Including the length of time for the programme


⁹ There was no direct clan link between an ex-militiaman and a host trainer

Employment


Of the original 505 ex-militiamen who completed the DDR programme in January 2007, 127 participants (24.8%) completed the Business Principles and Practices (BPP) track of the programme; and, 385 participants (76.2%) completed the Vocational Enterprise Based Training (VEBT) track of the programme.

Of the 312 participants who were present in Mogadishu to complete the tracer survey between June and October 2008, 80 participants (25.6%) were from the BPP stream; and, 232 (74.4%) were from the VEBT stream¹⁰.

Of the total 312 participants surveyed, 189 participants (60.6%) said that they were not currently employed; and, 123 participants (39.4%) indicated that they were currently employed.



Of the 80 BPP participants, some 66.2% were still working - with 51 remaining in their established business from DDR, 1 changed to electrical work, and 1 found a job working in pharmaceuticals¹¹.




With the current level of conflict, and the prevailing absolute anarchy - where criminal activity is ubiquitous at every level of Somali society - to have 2/3s of those trained in small business still active in small business is an outstanding result. This needs to be noted for future programme delivery, as it is a strong empirical signifier of the durability of good small business training.

¹⁰ This is fully representative of the original breakdown

¹¹ 27 had no current employment (33.8%)

Of the 232 VEBT participants, 162 were not currently employed (69.8%). Of those that still have employment, 52 VEBT participants (22.4%) had not changed their vocational skill attained through the VEBT; while 18 VEBT participants (7.8%) changed their area of work.


VEBT Participants' Employment Status



This result (70% unemployment for VEBT participants) is much more like what SAACID was expecting to see from this survey. The level of conflict, violence and criminality is all pervasive. Business activity at all levels has been systemically preyed upon by every militarised entity. Unemployment for the city is above 80%. Inflation, the dumping of massive amounts of fake currency, a deepening and broadening drought, and Diaspora disengagement, have also significantly contributed to the bleeding out of the Somali economy.


Of the total 312 participants, 31 participants (17 BPP and 14 VEBT) – 10%, claim to be currently employed by a third party business; 15 participants (6 BPP and 9 VEBT) - 4.8% claim to be currently employed by their families; 77 participants (30 BPP and 47 VEBT) – 24.7% claim to be self-employed, with the remaining 189 participants (60.6%) currently unemployed as stated above.

Employment Status



Time working in chosen field


When asked how much time the participants were able to work in their chosen field from the DDR programme, 22 participants (7.1%) said they were never able to work in their chosen field; 65 participants (20.8%) claimed they worked in their chosen field for 6 months or less; 130 participants (41.7%) worked in their field for 7-12 months; and 95 participants (30.4%) worked in their field from 13-18 months¹².



When you consider the above data, there is every reason to believe that if the economy of Mogadishu was able to sustain itself at even historical levels¹³, the level of employment for VEBT participants would very likely be above 70%; rather than the current 30%. The incessant grind of corruption, conflict and anarchy has bled out economic activity in the city and with it employment opportunities for the population.

Return to 'security' activity

Ninety-six percent (95.5%) or 298 of the 312 participants confirmed that they had not returned to 'security' activities. While 14 participants (4.5%) confirmed they had returned to some sort of security work. Two of the 14 (0.64%) confirmed that they had been hired as TFG policemen. Two of the 14 (0.64%) confirmed that they had been hired as military clones¹⁴. Two of the 14 (0.64%) confirmed that they now work for an opposition faction. Eight of the 14 (2.6%) indicated that they had returned to militia work.



¹² Until the time of the tracer survey

¹³ With about 40% unemployment prevailing in the city in the period since state collapse in 1991

¹⁴ 'Clones' are Somalis that have been trained by the Ethiopian military, placed in Ethiopian military uniform, and placed under Ethiopian military command and control.


Two of the participants that returned to some kind of ‘security’ work were BPP participants, while 12 were VEBT (including the 2 participants doing police work). All said they had they had no choice but to return to ‘security’ activities because they could not find a job, and they needed an income to support their families.

This compares to 6 participants that had indicated that they had (or would) return to militia activity in the January 2007 survey; and the 6 participants that were till undecided at that time. When you consider the events, and level of violence and prevailing anarchy that has developed in the intervening period – as well as a current unemployment rate of 60.6%, this figure is impressively low.

If one considers that the primary aim of a DDR programme is not only to disarm, but to reintegrate ex-militiamen into mainstream civil society, the amazingly low level of take-up ‘security’ work of ex-militiamen – even in a fully blown warzone – highlights the effectiveness of community-based (and owned) DDR programming.

DDR’s impact on the life of participants

In response to participants being asked how the DDR programme changed their life, 178 participants (57%) said their life was better; 19 participants said that it was the same as before (6%); and, 115 participants (37%) said their life was worse now.




The following table breaks this data down into BPP participants versus VEBT participants, with results signifying that BPP participants have been able to see an ongoing benefit in relatively greater numbers than the VEBT participants in the years since the program finished:

Impact on Life	BPP #	BPP %	VEBT #	VEBT %	Total #	Total %
Better	60	75%	118	51%	178	57%
Same	3	4%	16	7%	19	6%
Worse	17	21%	98	42%	115	37%
Total	80	100%	232	100%	312	100%

The following table provides the reasons as answered by the participants for how or why their lives have been made better, the same or worse. *Please note that these are different from the employment information above as they were subjective questions.*

Impact on Life	Better #	Better %	Same #	Same %	Worse #	Worse %	Total #	Total %
Forced to return to militia activity			12	63%	1	1%	13	4.2%
Couldn't find a job	2 ¹⁵	1.1%	5	26%	60 ¹⁶	52%	67	21.5%
More skills / create work opportunities	167 ¹⁷	93.8%					167	53.5%
Increased self confidence and morality	7 ¹⁸	3.9%					7	2.2%
Security situation made life worse	1	0.6%	2	11%	30 ¹⁹	26%	33	10.6%
Security situation combined with high unemployment					24	21%	24	7.7%
Militia life was too risky	1	0.6%					1	0.3%
Total	178	100%	19	100%	115	100%	312	100%

From the second linked question about why their situation was better or worse, it became evident that the programme had a majority long-term life-changing impact on the participants; and would in all probability have been overwhelmingly so, except for the fact of a foreign military occupation and full-blown insurgency – which has created systemic insecurity and destroyed the local economy (and employment opportunities).



¹⁵ However, both participants stated their life is still better because they have more skills now.

¹⁶ 1 participant said in addition to not being able to find work that the training wasn't long enough.

¹⁷ With 1 participant adding that despite the "better life" the program was too short, and another participant saying not only does he have more skills but his life is better because he is no longer ignorant.


¹⁸ These participants stated things such as: "I gave up robbing people," "I care about myself now and don't like bad deeds," "I have a free life and know between good and bad," "I have character to live with people," and "I have the confidence to create a new life."

¹⁹ 1 of these participants said in addition to heavy violence the inflation is making life worse.

Participants' suggested solutions to insecurity

Over the survey period (June through October 2009), participants were asked how they perceived the current security situation in Mogadishu. One hundred percent (all 312 participants) stated that the situation was extremely insecure. They were also asked what they saw as the solution to the insecurity; and the following provides a breakdown of their responses:

Suggested Solution	No. of Surveyed Participants	% of Surveyed Participants
Get peacekeepers	2	0.6%
New Government	41	13.1%
Reconciliation between TFG & Opposition	106	34.0%
Stop Foreign Interference	40	12.8%
Use of Sharia Law	41	13.1%
Withdraw Ethiopian Troops	81	26.0%
Total	311 ²⁰	99.7%



Of the 14 participants that admitted to returning to 'security' activities, 1 was the participant that refused to answer the question; 4 said, "withdraw Ethiopian troops"; 8 said, "reconciliation" (including 1 policeman); and, 1 said, "new government".

²⁰ One participant refused to answer this question.

Remittances

Eighty-three percent (259) of participants claimed that they do not receive money from abroad, while 17% (53) confirmed the receipt of remittances. Sixty-eight percent (36) of the 53 participants that received remittances also claimed to be unemployed.


Of all the questions asked, SAACID’s surveying team found that the results for this question were the least reliable.

It was obvious to SAACID’s team of surveyors that participants were lying about the number and amount of remittances received. There appeared to be a desire to downplay external assistance, in the vein hope that SAACID or another external actor was potentially preparing another programme for these participants to enter.

When cross-checking the level of remittances with the level of family income, it became obvious that an income bubble was occurring – that could only be explained by an underreporting in remittances.

SAACID’s surveying team indicated that it was more likely that a minimum of 2/3s of those interviewed were receiving some sort of remittance support.

Remittance support appears to have significantly increased since the worldwide increase in food pricing; though, those that did answer positively to remittance support also indicated that overseas relatives were under increasing stress in attempting to send money, as employment in external countries continued to erode, and the cost of living in external countries also rose considerably.




Remittance amounts received monthly were as follows²¹:

Amt \$	None	\$25	\$30	\$35	\$40	\$50	\$60	\$70	\$80	\$100	\$150	\$200
No.	259	2	1	1	1	22	2	1	2	16	4	1
%	83%	0.6%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	7.1%	0.6%	0.3%	0.6%	5.1%	1.3%	0.3%

²¹ With the largest number of participants (22 of the 53 participants–41.5%) receiving approximately \$50 per month

Debt

Forty-one percent of participants (128) claimed they do not owe any debt, while 59% of participants (184) claim to have some amount of credit owed, mostly with shopkeepers. Of those participants that owe debt, 67% (123 of the 184 participants) were unemployed.



The average amount of debt of the total 312 survey participants was \$87.97. However, among the 184 participants with debt, the average amount was \$149.17. The breakdown of debt amounts owed were in the following ranges:

Amt .	None	<\$50	\$51-\$100	\$101-\$150	\$151-\$200	\$201-\$250	\$251-\$300	\$301-\$350	\$351-\$400	\$401-\$450	\$500 +
No.	128	58	61	13	24	5	9	1	3	2	8
%	41%	18.6%	19.6%	4.2%	7.7%	1.6%	2.9%	0.3%	1%	0.6%	2.6%


Income

The average monthly family income of DDR participants at the completion of the DDR programme (January 2007) was \$57.61, while the average monthly family income at the time of the tracer survey was \$90.16 per month, a 56.5% increase. Divided by the average household size of the DDR participants surveyed (7.99 people per household), a monthly income of \$7.21 per person and \$11.28 per person respectively is indicated.

Comparing participants' households monthly spending at the completion of the DDR programme to the time of the tracer survey, the following was found:

- 90 participants (28.8%) claimed to have a reduction in their income;
- 3 participants (1%) claimed to have no income at the end of DDR and now have \$50, \$70 and \$110/month respectively;
- 13 participants (4.2%) claimed no change in their income;
- 24 participants (7.7%) claimed up to a 25% increase in their income;
- 21 participants (6.7%) claimed a 26-50% increase in their income;
- 30 participants (9.6%) claimed a 51-75% increase in their income;
- 47 participants (15%) claimed a 76-100% increase in their income (a 100% increase); and,
- 84 participants (27%) claimed to have more than doubled their income.

Changes in Income




Household Monthly Food Spending

The average monthly food spending for participants’ households at the completion of the DDR programme was \$36.76 per month, while the average food spending at the time of the tracer survey was \$61.38 per month, an overall average 67% increase. Divided by the average household size this is \$4.60 and \$7.68 per person per month respectively.

Comparing participants’ households monthly spending at the completion of the DDR programme to the time of the tracer survey, the following is found:

- 66 participants’ households (21.2%) spend less on food;
- 3 participants’ households (1%) spend the same on food;
- 22 participants’ households (7.1%) spend up to 25% more on food;
- 36 participants’ households (11.5%) spend 26-50% more of food;
- 39 participants’ households (12.5%) spend 51-75% more on food;
- 49 participants’ households (15.7%) spend 76-100% more on food (with 36 participants doubling the amount they spend – a 100% increase);
- 79 participants’ households (25.3%) have more than doubled their food spending;
- and,
- 18 participants (5.8%) claim their households do not have any income to spend on food.


Changes in Food Spending



DDR income spending other than food

Participants were asked, in addition to food, how have they used the income earned since completing the DDR programme. Multiple answers were permitted.

- 184 participants (59%) said they used the income on clothing and/or shoes;
- 179 participants (57.4%) said medicine and healthcare;
- 107 participants (34.3%) said school fees, either for themselves or for a household member;
- 31 participants (9.9%) said some sort of electronic or battery device (a TV, radio, recorder, watch);
- 30 participants (9.6%) said a telephone – with 28 being mobile phones and 2 landlines;
- 24 participants (7.7%) said furniture;
- 14 participants (4.5%) said they gave money to their family;
- 7 participants (2.2%) said they added to their business (5) or bought extra work tools (2); and
- 7 participants (2.2%) said they arranged electricity and water for their household.




- In addition to the above 5 participants (1.6%) said they bought items such as books, pens and video cassettes, 4 participants (1.3%) said they used money to get married, 1 participant (0.3%) bought bedsprings, 1 participant bought dishes, 1 participant bought an umbrella, 1 participant gave money to his wife to create a small shop, and 1 participants claimed he used the income for *khaat*.

Improvements to dwelling

Participants were also asked if they used the income to make any changes/improvements to their home dwelling, and responded as follows:


- 203 participants (65%) said they had not used income to improve their dwelling;
- 26 participants (8%) said that they had used income to help pay their rent; and
- 83 participants (27%) confirmed improvements in their dwelling - including anything from painting, to adding a room or toilet, to repairing their home, or building a small house.



Household flight from Mogadishu

The following data was in response to participants being asked if any of their household members had left Mogadishu since the conclusion of the DDR programme:

- 232 participants (74.4%) said no;
- 62 participants (19.9%) said yes, because of insecurity;
- 7 participants (2.2%) said yes, because of unemployment;
- 1 participants (0.3%) said yes, to help their parents;
- 1 participant (0.3%) said yes, due to a lack of food;
- 2 participants (0.6%) said yes, in search of education;
- 4 participants (1.3%) said yes, in order to find another life abroad; and
- 3 participants (1%) said yes, but did not provide a reason.



Overall, 80 participants (25.6%) said some of their household members had left Mogadishu since January 2007. Considering the numbers of displaced determined in other surveys since that time, this figure is considered to be quite low.

Household deaths

Participants were asked if there have been any deaths in their household since the conclusion of the DDR programme, and if so, how many and from what causes. Seventy-seven percent (239) of participants reported no household deaths, while 23% of participants (73) did.

The following chart provides this data reported by numbers of participants:

Cause of Death / # of deaths:	Number of Household Deaths							Total Deaths
	1	2	3	4	5	6	20*	
Death by Gunfire	11	5	2		1			32+
Killed by Ethiopian troops	7	1			1			20
Killed by Government troops	2		2					2
Killed by Gangs	1							1
Death by Bomb Explosion	1					1		7
Malaria	11	3	1					20+
Cholera	1							1+
Disease & Sickness	4	1	1					9
TB	6							6+
Natural Causes	1							1
Car Crash		1						2
Accident				1				4
Died in Sea off Libya	2							2
Multiple Deaths by More Than One Cause*		4					1	28
Total Household Deaths	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	135+ Total Deaths
DDR Participants Reporting Household Death(s) = 73	47	15	6	1	2	1	1	N/A

* Five participants claimed multiple household deaths by different causes. One participant lost 2 household members from gunfire and TB respectively; 3 participants lost household members from malaria and TB each respectively; and 1 participant claimed to have lost 20 household members from gunfire, TB, malaria and cholera.


+ Therefore, the number of household deaths from TB, gunfire, malaria and cholera are slightly higher than reported in the chart by an unknown amount - dependent upon the participant who lost 20 household members.

A total number of reported household deaths of 135 were **5.4% of the number of household members**, according to the household sizes as reported previously for a total of 2,495 people.

Overall, there were at least 63 security/war related deaths, and at least 43 health related deaths.

Participants' Greatest Needs

Participants were asked what their family's greatest need was at this time, and responded as follows, with multiple answers permitted:




Identified as Great Need	Yes	Yes % of Total	No	No % of Total
Food	167	53.5%	145	46.5%
Healthcare	116	37.2%	196	62.8%
Education	147	47.1%	165	52.9%
Employment	200	64.1%	112	35.9%
Shelter	53	17%	259	83%
Safety	281	90%	31	10%

Livelihood activity suggestions

Participants were asked, based on their experience of the DDR programme, and in consideration of the current situation in Mogadishu, what other emergency livelihood activities they would suggest for militiamen in Mogadishu. Participants responded as follows:

- 92 participants (29.5%) suggested any job creation programme;
- 139 participants (44.5%) suggested DDR;
- 25 participants (8%) suggested a Food-for-Work (FFW) programme;
- 51 participants (16.3%) suggested a vocational training programme;
- 1 participant (0.3%) suggested business training;
- 1 participants (0.3%) suggested education in general; and,
- 3 participants (1%) did not make a recommendation.



SAACID's conclusions and recommendations

After completing 3 DDR programmes now since 2001 (2 with UNDP) SAACID believes that indigenous community-owned DDR exhibits the best chance for militiamen to fully disarm and be fully reintegrated back into their local communities.

There are also strong multiplier effects in integrating local communities into the DDR process; with local communities and businesses benefiting from increased security, as well as economically from the process.

In large urban settings, as well as in rural towns, this form of community-owned DDR is both economically viable and scalable to match needs. For more remote rural settings, the template is still viable, but the course content and focus will need to be revised to match community needs.

This tracking survey – implemented 18 months after the completion of the last DDR programme; and in the midst of a full-scale insurgency – underlines SAACID's belief and commitment to bottom-up ownership and implementation of DDR.

From this survey and the results of the DDR programmes, SAACID would recommend the following in terms of timeline:

- Increase the programme period from 14 to 17 months
- Maintain the mobilisation period at 1 month
- Increase the numeracy and literacy element from 3 to 4 months
- Increase the vocational training stream from 10 to 12 months – utilising the extra 2 months to prepare participants to receive a micro-credit loan; as well as receiving additional vocational training
- Increase the business stream from 8 to 10 months – including more training on business plan development. Also consider converting the micro-grant to a micro-credit loan. SAACID believes this is both viable and desirable. This would need to be re-sequenced with the vocational training (or other) packages that are presented to participants.

Of the 505 (of 512) militiamen that successfully completed the DDR programme, only 14 (2.77%) had returned to any kind of 'security' work 18 months on. Two confirmed that they had been hired as TFG policemen. Two confirmed that they had been hired as military clones²². Two confirmed that they now work for an opposition faction. Eight confirmed that they had returned to freelance militia work (1.58%).

In comparing the vocational training and business development streams utilised in the last DDR programme, it is obvious that the business development stream produced better outcomes that allowed participants to better endure a full scale insurgency; massive inflation; massive reduction in economic activity, due to the deliberate targeting of market and nodes of economic activity; and unemployment in excess of 80% in the wider community. Two thirds of business stream participants remained fully employed after 2 years of occupation and insurgency. This compared to 70% unemployment amongst vocationally trained participants.

²² 'Clones' are Somalis that have been trained by the Ethiopian military, placed in Ethiopian military uniform, and placed under Ethiopian military command and control.

SAACID believes that community-ownership of the vocational training stream is still a cornerstone of DDR programming. Vocational training – more than the business stream – bonds local communities to ex-combatants; and makes the critical link to full reintegration possible. This is highlighted by host businesses displaying ongoing links to 2/3s of participants in the vocational stream.

The vocational training stream would have been far more durable if micro-credit had been attached to the package as SAACID had recommended. SAACID has been operating micro-credit programming since 1996, and has significant data indicating such programming is critical in providing durability for transition to small business activity in adverse circumstances.

It is important to note that in this last programme, militiamen took the full benefit of the programme. While local communities received some benefit from economic spinoffs through training, local communities could and should be far more involved in the whole “DDR” process.

SAACID believes that DDR should be part of a broader and deeper reconciliation process amongst clans and communities. This is best done by also providing training positions for civil society as well. One of the criticisms from civil society is that militiamen – who are a cause of conflict and violence – receive the direct benefits of such DDR programmes, while civil society – who are law abiding – receive no direct benefit at all.

In the second DDR programme that SAACID conducted in partnership with UNDP, 50% of the positions available were given to civil society members (with gender equity). This programme fully engaged all segments of Somali civil society, and more than the 3rd programme, allowed for an excellent transition for ex-combatants back into civil society.


It is SAACID’s recommendation that the DDR tag be dropped completely, and such programming be called “alternative livelihood development and weapon reduction programme”. This would allow for 50% civil society access (with gender equity) and an even greater acceptance of reintegrated ex-combatants. This should also allow for such programming to be implemented not just in a strict “post-conflict” context, but in ongoing conflict contexts – as a pro-active measure to create confidence-building and reconciliation.

SAACID has also found that by linking DDR type programming to other community development and recovery initiatives – also with strong community ownership – there are very strong multiplier effects in terms of wider reconciliation, peace-building and governance development.


ANNEX 1

BPP Market and Partnership Choices


Choice of Business Style



Partnership Choice Between Family or Friend



Choice of Market to Operate In




Ba'ad Market	San'a Market	Bahani Market	Manbolyo Market
Bakaro Market	Arjantin Market	Yaqshid area	Jungle Market
Hamar-weyne	Towfiiq Market	Abdul-aziz Market	Other

* "Other" includes markets or areas with 3 or less entries – they are listed below

• Karaan Market	3
• Warberi Market	3
• Near or in home	3
• SOS market	2
• Taleh area	2
• Shibis area	2
• Hawl-wadag area	2
• Shingani area	2
• Suuq Bacaad Market	2
• Bilajo Market	1
• Hamar-jijab area	1
• Baar Ubah area	1
• Blacksea area	1
• KPP Market	1
• Hamar-weyne area	1
• Madina area	1
• Ali Kamin area	1
• CC area	1
• Eltuboweyne area	1
• Fagah area	1
• Jamhuria Market	1
• Lafweyn area	1
• Miranayo small market	1
• Fagax area	1

Choice of Business to Operate



Food Shop	Pharmacy	Electrical Goods
Clothing	Fuel	Mixed Small Goods
Cosmetics	Furniture	Building materials
Charcoal	Telephone franchise	Other

* "Other" includes businesses with 1 entry – they are listed below

- Goat Market 1
- Spare parts 1
- Bookshop 1
- Restaurant 1
- Stereo equipment 1
- Bananas 1
- Shoes 1
- Butcher 1
- Internet café 1
- Food and charcoal 1
- Wooden beds 1
- Salt 1

ANNEX II

Survey Tracking Impact – Micro-Grant Stream

A Survey Conducted Six Months after the First Micro-Grant Was Provided to Business Development Participants

Summary

A phased-up DDR programme began in December 2005 for 512 freelance militiamen – drawn equally from all 16 districts of Mogadishu.


One hundred and twenty seven of the militiamen chose to specialise in business development (113 continued to have active businesses at the time of the 3rd survey) – whereby each participant would receive a phased micro-grant totalling US \$440. After 3-months of Literacy and Numeracy Training (LNT) and 2-months of specialised Business Principles and Practice (BPP) training, the first grant of US \$200 was provided to the participants; then US \$150; and the final tranche was a US \$90 grant.

This short survey was conducted 6-months after the initial micro-grant, and was designed to collect data on the effectiveness of the micro-grant to date.

The average family size for this group is 7.7; and the average family monthly income was US \$82 (before programme entry) – with 19.2% of the group indicating that they had received at least part of their monthly income in the form of remittances.

Below is a summary of the results.

What was the type of business?




“Other” included:

Photographic studio (1)
Restaurant (1)
Bicycle rental business (1)
Electrical business (1)
Banana business (1)
Food – wholesale (2)

Shoe business (2)
Salt business (1)
Spare parts (2)
Bookshop (1)
Camel meat business (1)


What was the place of business?




“Other” included:

- | | | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Sii Sii area (3) | Jamhuriya Market (1) | Bar Ubah area (1) | Lafwayn area (1) | Behani Market (3) |
| Taleh area (1) | Hawl-wadag District (2) | Behani area (2) | Jungle market (1) | Via Ajiko area (1) |
| SOS area (2) | Kpp Market (2) | Towfiq Market (2) | Black Sea market (1) | No fixed place (1) |


Has the participant attended his business regularly?



In your opinion, is the participant taking the business opportunity seriously?




What was the monthly turnover that was achieved?



- *After the third US \$90 micro-grant tranche (6-months of business trading), the average monthly turnover per business was US \$289 – the consecutive 2-monthly increases in turnover were: \$108 - \$228 - \$289*


What was the monthly take-home profit that was achieved?

Monthly Take-Home Profit




- After the third US \$90 micro-grant tranche (6-months of business trading), the average monthly take-home profit per business was US \$40 - the consecutive 2-monthly increases in take-home profit were: \$13 - \$39 - \$40

What constraints have been faced by the participants thus far?



** Multiple answers were accepted for this question*


How will the participant utilise the third micro-grant tranche (US \$90)?



** Multiple answers were accepted for this question*

How do you rate the business?

Monitor's Rating For Each Business



1 = Failed 3 = Below average performance 5 = Above average performance 7 = Perfect performance
2 = Very poor performance 4 = Average performance 6 = Excellent performance

ANNEX III

EXIT SURVEY FOR 491 PARTICIPANTS FOR THE DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT AND RETRAINING PROGRAMME (DDR) IMPLEMENTED FOR 512 PARTICIPANTS IN MOGADISHU IN 2005-7

Conducted in January 2007

Executive Summary

A demobilisation, disarmament and retraining programme (DDR) was implemented over 14 months (December 2005 – January 2007) in Mogadishu City for 512 militiamen. This was the second voluntary weapon's destruction programme conducted in Mogadishu City (both by SAACID in partnership with UNDP).

Funding for the programme was provided by UNDP; and the programme was implemented by SAACID.

Five hundred and twelve militiamen were invited to participate in the programme from all 16 districts of Mogadishu City.

Thirty-two places were offered to each of the 16 participating districts.

The programme was broken into three core elements.

The first was a 1-month prefatory and mobilisation period. In this period the local leaders in each targeted district were mobilised and the programme outlined so that they could provide effective input and partnership. This was also the month for the collection of one fully functioning automatic rifle from each participant.

The second element was 3-months of literacy, numeracy, health and civics education (Literacy and Numeracy Training - LNT). This component was conducted every afternoon at SAACID's primary, secondary and vocational school in the Shibis district of Mogadishu.

The third component was either 2-months of business training and 6-months of phased micro-grants; or 10 months of vocational training in a skill of the participant's choice (Vocational Enterprise Business training – VEBT). All the participants had previously chosen which areas they would like to train in and they were then distributed to host training sites based on those preferences. All host trainers were voluntary private businesses. VEBT participants also attended entrepreneurship classes for the last 2-months of their 10-month vocational training course.

Five hundred and five of the 512 militiamen selected for the programme completed all elements of the programme. Of the 7 that did not complete, 5 left the country and 2 were killed by stray bullets as they were travelling to or from their training venues.


This survey was designed to elicit information about the DDRP from the remaining 505 participants. Four hundred and ninety-one participated in the survey – 12 business stream participants (2.3% of the participants) closed their businesses at the completion

of the programme; while 2 more were on business out of the city at the time the survey was conducted. Questions were asked in different ways to overcome any possible misunderstanding of the questions by participants. Or, to try and overcome any possible resistance or obfuscation to questions that the participants might feel suspicious about.



The participants were extremely open and forthcoming in their answers and SAACID field staff had no problems implementing this survey.

The results of the survey of 491 participants are elaborated throughout the rest of the document.

1. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the programme?



2. In your opinion, what were the weaknesses of the programme?



Eighty-two percent of respondents indicated that there were no weaknesses in the programme. This is up from 39% indicating 'no weaknesses' in the 2003-4 programme.


Of the 18% of respondents that indicated that the programme had weaknesses, virtually all referred to the insufficient length of time to absorb lessons.

A good example of this was those citing the numeracy and literacy component of the programme as a weakness. All were referring to the insufficient time given to really become numerate and literate.


Criticism of the business stream (15 of 33 respondents) referred to the brevity of the specialised business training (2 months); and the insufficient micro-grant capital provided (18 of 33 respondents).

3. Were you happy with the LNT element of the programme (including the length of the LNT element)? If you were not happy, what would you suggest being changed (including nominating the length of the LNT element)?

The 79-21% breakdown was exactly the same as in the 2003-4 DDR exit survey.



The breakdown of the suggested extra length of time for the LNT component by the 104 (21%) participants who were unhappy is as follows:




The average extra length of time suggested by the 95 participants who indicated more time was needed for the component was 6 months – down from the 7 ½ month average in the 2003-4 programme.

Of the 9 who indicated to cancel or reduce the length of the LNT element, 7 of the 9 were asking for the LNT training time to go to more vocational or business stream training; the other 2 indicated that they were numerate and literate already.


4. Were you happy with the VEBT/BPP element of the programme (including the length of the VEBT/BPP element)? If you were not happy, what would you suggest being changed (including nominating the length of the VEBT/BPP element)?

The 89-11% breakdown for this 2005-7 DDR programme showed a significant increase in vocational and business stream satisfaction over the 4-months of vocation training in 2003-4 – where 64% of the participants were completely happy with the training element.



Of the 56 respondents that expressed dissatisfaction, 4 were business development participants who believed more micro-grant cash needed to be supplied and the rest believed that the training time needed to be increased.


The breakdown of the suggested extra length of time for the VEBT/BPP component by the 52 respondents who were unhappy is as follows:



The average extra length of time suggested by the 52 respondents for the VEBT/BPP component was 15 months. This was up significantly on the 9 months suggested in 2003-4

5. Were you happy with the training incentive? If not, what would you suggest being changed?

In the 2003-4 exit survey of DDR participants, 31% expressed dissatisfaction with the training incentive. The 2005-7 programme has seen a substantive improvement in participant satisfaction.




All 34 respondents that were unhappy with the incentive (7%) expressed a desire for the incentive to be increased.

6. Were you happy with the payment process? If not, what would you suggest in terms of changes?


In the 2003-4 DDR programme, some 90% of participants indicated that they were happy with the payment process. This has risen to 97% in the current programme.

Of those unhappy, 11 respondents (2%) requested that the payments should be made in US dollars, so as to mitigate the effects of inflation on the Somali Shilling. While 6 respondents indicated that they were unhappy with delays in their monthly payments.




7. Were you happy with SAACID's administration of the programme? If not, where would you suggest that we could improve?

Three of the respondents indicated that they were unhappy with SAACID's administration of the programme. They did not indicate why they were unhappy, or how SAACID could improve programme delivery.



8. Were you happy to give machinegun in exchange for the training you received?


Thirty-seven respondents indicated that they did not want to give their weapon up for the training. In the 2003-4 programme, 98% of participants said that they were happy to give up their weapon for training. In that programme, the participants were 50% militia and 50% from civil society. This may explain the variance.




9. Do you think that you will get full-time employment with your host trainer after the completion of the programme (VEBT)?

Three hundred and seventy-six ex-militiamen participated in the vocational training stream. Some 226 of those ex-militiamen indicated that they believed that their current training would offer them full-time employment after the current DDR programme was concluded. When comparing this to the host trainers, who said that they would be offering 37% of the current trainees' full-time positions at the conclusion of the DDR programme, it is evident that the expectations of the ex-militiamen are exceeding supply.


That said, many of the ex-militia that responded in the survey indicated that they could not only get work with the current host trainer, but also work for themselves or with their family, or work for another employer. Only a tracer study will be able to determine how expectations have matched reality.



10. Do you think that you will work for yourself or your family full-time after the programme is completed (VEBT)?




11. Do you think that you will be able to get full-time employment with another employer after the programme is completed (VEBT)?



12. Would you like to have had access to micro-credit to begin your own business after the completion of the programme (VEBT)?

Two hundred and ninety-two (292) (98.32%) of the participants indicated that they would like access to micro-credit to begin their own business after the completion of the programme. This group expressed economic independence and status and prestige in their local communities as the primary motivations for this point of view.

Five (5) (1.68%) of the participants indicated that they would not like access to micro-credit after the completion of the programme. This group indicated that they did not possess the requisite skills to run their own business, and did not want to risk defaulting on any prospective loan.




13. Will you return to militia work after the programme is completed?

If yes, why (explain)?

In the 2003-4 DDR programme conducted by SAACID, 83% of the participants indicated that they would not return to militia work. While 9% said they would and 8% were undecided. The primary reason for their decision to go back to militia work was that the length of the programme was too short (3 months of numeracy and literacy and 4 months of vocational training), and they did not have enough time to absorb the lessons; thereby not being able to provide a viable income for their families.

There was a significant decrease in the number of people who said that they would return to militia work after this 2005-7 programme (3 months of numeracy and literacy and 10 months of vocational training; or 2 months of specialised business development training followed by a 6-month phased micro-grant rollout). Of the 6 people who said that they would return to militia work, 4 said the reason was that they needed more time to absorb the lessons (1 business participant and 5 vocational training participants). Of the 4 that said that they were considering a return to militia work, all indicated that they were worried that they had not learned enough to secure a job after the programme was completed (all vocational training students).



14. What are your hopes for the future?

15. Other comments?


After reviewing the answers to these 2 questions, it was advantageous to join the responses together, as most of the answers overlapped each other.

Many of the responses were related to one another, but SAACID felt that there was value in recording the particular emphasis in the various responses.


“A good future” included the idea that the respondent desired a viable job that provided enough income to meet his family’s needs.

“Continue/increase DDR opportunities” – there was a strong emphasis amongst the respondents that this opportunity be repeated so that all militiamen had an opportunity to be given an alternative to ‘militia work’.

The explicit “a job and security” answer provided by 101 of the respondents emphasised the idea that the goal of these ex-militiamen is to secure viable employment that meets the economic security needs of their families.



The graphic representation records individual responses of 10 or more in the same category (the desire for a micro-grant recorded 10 responses).



ANNEX IV

EXIT SURVEY FOR 42 HOST TRAINERS FOR THE DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT AND RETRAINING (DDR) PROGRAMME CONDUCTED FOR 512 PARTICIPANTS IN MOGADISHU IN 2005-7

Conducted in January 2007

Executive Summary

An expanded demobilisation, disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme was conducted in Mogadishu for 14 months in 2005-7. This programme built on the first voluntary weapon's destruction programme conducted in Mogadishu City in 2003-4 (also done by SAACID and UNDP).

Funding for the programme was provided by UNDP; and the programme was implemented by SAACID.

Five hundred and twelve militiamen were invited to participate in the programme from all 16 districts of Mogadishu City – 32 per district.

The programme was broken into 3 core components.

The first was a 1-month prefatory and mobilisation period. In this period the local leaders in each district were mobilised and the programme outlined so that they could provide effective input and partnership. This was also the month for the collection, testing and decommissioning of functioning machineguns from each participant.

The second component was 3-months of literacy, numeracy, health and civics education (Literacy and Numeracy Training - LNT). This component was conducted every afternoon at SAACID's primary, secondary and vocational school in the Shibis district of Mogadishu.

The third component was either 2-months of business training and 6-months of phased micro-grants; or 10 months of vocational training in a skill of the participant's choice (Vocational Enterprise Business training – VEBT).

SAACID invited local businesses to become host training sites. After evaluation of interested businesses, SAACID selected 42 businesses to become host trainers – based on capacity, competency and ability to match the needs of the participants.

This survey was designed to elicit information about the DDRP from the 42 host trainers who participated in the training programme.

Questions were asked in different ways to overcome any possible misunderstanding of the questions by host trainers. Or, to try and overcome any possible resistance or obfuscation to questions that the host trainers might feel suspicious about.

The host trainers were extremely open and forthcoming in their answers and SAACID field staff had no problems implementing this survey.


It was implemented in the last month of the VEBT element of the training.

1. In your opinion, what were the strengths of the programme?

Most of the host trainers took a self-interested view of this question and promoted their element of the programme.

- 57% (24) said that the vocational training element of the programme was the strongest element of the programme
- 9.5% (4) said that the tailoring vocational training element was the strongest element of the programme
- 7.1% (3) said that the motor-mechanic vocational training element was the strongest element of the programme
- 4.8% (2) said that the welding vocational training element was the strongest element of the programme
- 4.8% (2) said that the auto-electric vocational training element was the strongest element of the programme
- 4.8% (2) said that the whole programme was strong
- 2.4% (1) said that the auto-mechanic vocational training element was the strongest element of the programme

2. In your opinion, what were the weaknesses of the programme?



Unhappiness with the business stream was because they thought the amount of time given to the participants on business theory and development was too short (2 months)

3. **Were you happy with the payment process (please explain)?**

- 79% of the host trainers (33) said that they were completely happy with the payment process
- 21% of the host trainers (9) said that the training levee provided for each trainee was too low – with most suggesting that it be raised to US \$50 / trainee / month

4. **From your observations, how do the participants see the training format?**


- 95% (40) of the host trainers indicated that the ex-militiamen were happy with the programme
- 2.4% of the host trainers (1) indicated that throughout the programme some of the ex-militiamen had suggested other ideas for training that should be considered
- 2.4% of the host trainers (1) indicated that throughout the programme some of the ex-militiamen had suggested computer training as well as their chosen vocational stream

5. **Were you happy with the length of the VEBT training (please explain – if they indicate too short, or too long, please ask them for the length that they suggest)?**

37% of the host trainers (15) indicated that they were completely happy with the length of the training programme. This compares to 100% of the host trainers who were not happy with the length of the training cycle for the DDR programme implemented in 2003-4.




When asked what would be the optimal length of the training cycle in 2003-4, the host trainers gave an average time of 13 months. While the host trainers in the current programme indicated that the average optimal length of the training cycle should be 13 months.

The training period for VEBT in this programme was 10 months.



6. What specialisation are you teaching?

The specialisations taught were as follows:





8. **Were you happy with SAACID's management of the programme? If not, where would you suggest that we could improve?**

All 42 (100%) host trainers indicated that they were happy with SAACID's administration of the programme – up from 94% in the 2003-4 programme.


9. **Will you keep on candidates for full-time work after the programme is completed?
If yes, how many?**

- 95% of the host trainers (40) indicated that they would be keeping some or all of their trainees on as full-time employees of the programme
- 5% of the host trainers (2) indicated that they would not be keeping any of their trainees on after the programme



37% of all vocational trainees (144) were guaranteed full-time employment from the host trainers

10. **Do you think that the candidates are trained sufficiently to begin their own business activities or work effectively for someone else? If yes, are you happy for the candidates to go into their own business or work for others?**



Of those host trainers that indicated that the trainees were ready (25), 24% (6) indicated that they still suggested that the trainees work for an employer to get more practical experience before venturing into their own business.

11. **Do you think that the addition of micro-credit to the programme would enhance the capacity of the host trainers?**

98% of host trainers (41) indicated that they believed micro-credit would benefit the programme through enhancing the capacity of host trainers to deliver a better training package – especially in the area of new and better tools and equipment.

One host trainer said that only micro-grants should be given to the host trainers to enhance trainer capacity.

12. **Do you think that the addition of micro-credit to the programme would enhance the capacity of the trainees?**

95% of host trainers (40) believed that the addition of micro-credit for trainees (once they had completed their training) would significantly enhance outcomes from the programme.

5% of host trainers (2) indicated that micro-credit should be given on a case-by-case basis – reviewing the character of the ex-militiamen throughout the lifetime of the programme.

13. Did you have any problems with the candidates in the programme? If yes, what were they? How did you deal with the problems? How do you think the problems could be solved both by SAACID and the host trainers?

86% of host trainers (36) indicated that they had no problems with the ex-militiamen throughout the training element of the programme.

14% of host trainers (6) indicated that they had some problems.


These problems included:

- Poor attendance (4)
- Breaking tools (1)
- General disturbances (1)

All host trainers that indicated that they had problems also went on to emphasise that the problems that they had were all solved in partnership with SAACID and the parents or guardians of the ex-militiamen.


14. Do you think the militia candidates will return to militia work, or do you think that the programme has provided them with enough opportunity to engage in more productive activities?

- 88% of host trainers (37) were certain that none of their trainees would return to 'militia-work'
- 12% of host trainers indicated that they felt at least some of their trainees might return to 'militia-work' – primarily because they had still not fully absorbed the lessons that had been taught. This is down from 27% in the 2003-4 exit survey for host trainers.



15. **Have you encountered any problems with participants addicted to *khaat*? Do you think SAACID's strategy of teaching LNT to candidates in the afternoon (when they would normally be chewing) was effective in breaking the addiction? If no, what more does SAACID need to do to remedy this if you see it as a problem?**

- 88% of host trainers (37) indicated that they had no problems related to *khaat* addiction; and believed that SAACID's strategy for breaking the addiction had been successful.
- 10% of host trainers (4) indicated that some of their trainees had an ongoing addiction to *khaat*
- 2% of host trainers (1) indicated that they had a problem at the beginning of the training, but that the problem had ceased early on




16. **Have you been happy to participate in this programme (give answers for yes or no)?**

If yes, why?

If no, why?


100% of host trainers indicated that they were happy to participate in the programme




17. **Would you recommend this programme to other potential host trainers?**

- 83% of host trainers (35) indicated that they would recommend the programme to other potential host trainers
- 17% of host trainers (7) indicated that the current host trainers were sufficient, and that no new host trainers needed to be included


18. **What suggestions would you give to new host trainers that had never participated in such a programme?**



19. If the programme was to be expanded, do you have any suggestions that would improve the programme?



20. Other comments?



ANNEX V

Model Tracer Survey Form

Full Name _____ DDR Participant No. _____

District _____ Tel no _____ Age _____

Married/divorced/single _____ Current household size _____

Is your family currently displaced _____ How long _____

BPP or VEBT _____ What business or skill learned _____

Was the DDR LNT/VEBT/BPP training long enough – why _____

Have you kept any relationship with your trainer _____

Does he still help you when requested _____

Current employment (if any) _____

If different to DDR training – why changed _____

What district are you employed in _____

Are you self unemployed/ employed/ family employed/ business employed _____

If you have returned to militia activities, why _____

No of years as a militiaman: Before DDR _____ After DDR programme _____

Since the completion of DDR training, how long have you been able to work in non-militia activities _____

How long in your chosen field _____ How long in other activities _____

How has the DDR training programme change your life?
Worse/Same/Better? Why? For example: it's worse because of security situation, or because I couldn't find a job; the same because I had to return to militia work, better because I have more skills and can find work

How do you perceive the current security situation in Mogadishu? What is your solution?

Monthly family income: At the end of the DDR programme \$ _____ Now US \$ _____

Do you receive money from abroad (Remittances)? YES or NO
If yes, how much every month? \$ _____

Do you have any debt or credit owed? YES or NO
If YES, who or for what do you owe? _____ How much \$ _____

Monthly spending on food for household: At the end of the DDR programme \$ _____ Now \$ _____

Other than for food, how have you used the income you have created since completing the DDR programme? _____

Have you made any changes/improvements to your home dwelling with the income from this programme? If yes, what? _____

Have there been any deaths in your household since the conclusion of the DDR programme?
If yes, how many deaths? _____ From what causes?

Have any of your household members left Mogadishu since the conclusion of the DDR programme? If yes, why did they leave? _____

Based upon your experiences of this programme, and with the current situation in Mogadishu, what other emergency livelihood activities would you suggest for militia in Mogadishu?

What is your family's greatest need at this time? Food/Medicine/Education/Employment/Shelter/Safety/Other:
