Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Programme (DDRP)

 

UNDP - SAACID

 

Mogadishu, Somalia

 

 

10 August 2003 – 26 July 2004

 

 

         

UNDP official at opening ceremony                UNDP official providing input at the closing ceremony

 

Executive Summary

 

A pilot demobilisation, disarmament and retraining programme (DDRP) was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia for between 10 August 2003 and 28 July 2004. This was the first voluntary weapon’s destruction programme conducted in Mogadishu City.

 

Funding for the programme was provided by UNDP; and the programme was implemented by SAACID.

 

Three hundred people were invited to participate in the programme from 6 of the 16 districts of Mogadishu. A 7th area of Mogadishu was also included – ‘Bermuda’ - which is an impoverished and marginalised area of the city that has been historically overlooked.

 

The districts that were offered the chance for training places in this programme were:

 

 

These districts were chosen because 6 other districts had just participated in an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) implemented by SAACID and funded by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Italian Government (2003). The districts nominated for the ILO pilot economic recovery programme (garbage collection) were:

 

 

The idea of choosing 6 different districts (and Bermuda) for the UNDP - DDRP was to ensure as much inclusiveness, transparency and cooperation amongst grassroots leaders as possible. SAACID envisions a grassroots building-block process as the most viable development strategy for Mogadishu at this point in time.

 

Forty-three training places were offered to each of the 6 participating districts; and a further 42 places were offered to the people of the Bermuda area in Mogadishu.

 

The Bermuda area includes parts of three different districts. It has been nicknamed 'Bermuda', because if anyone goes in, they don't come out. It is a general no-go zone - even for mainstream Somalis. This area is densely populated with mostly Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's), minority clans and ‘Bantu’ Somalis. Even if a district (say Hodan) were given some training places, no one from the Bermuda area of Hodan would be selected. The people in this area are currently effectively marginalised from all forms of participation in Mogadishu (political and economic). SAACID felt strongly that if this programme was to add value to the reconciliation and reintegration process in Mogadishu, then concrete steps had to be made at an early stage to empower the minorities and marginalised in the city.

 

One hundred and fifty of the 300 places went to active militia. The other 150 places were divided equally between men and women from mainstream civil society (75 men and 75 women). There was some resistance to the training places given for women, but strong advocacy prevailed (SAACID is a women’s NGO) and the women’s training places received final unanimous support from all participating grassroots leaders.

 

The programme was broken into three core components.

 

The first was a 1-month prefatory and mobilisation period. In this period the local leaders in each targeted district were mobilised and the programme outlined so that they could provide effective input and partnership. This was also the month for the collection of one fully functioning automatic rifle from each participant. In an exit survey of all participants conducted in April 2004, 98% of participants indicated that they were happy to give up an automatic weapon for the training that they received. Only 2% of participants were unhappy, highlighting the length of training being too short for the weapon provided.

 

        

Weapon’s registration                                                        Weapon’s armoury

 

The second component was 3-months of literacy, numeracy, health and civics education (Literacy and Numeracy Training - LNT). This component was conducted every afternoon at SAACID’s primary, secondary and vocational school in the Shibis district of Mogadishu. Seventy-one percent of the participants were happy with this element of the programme. Twenty-nine percent indicated that they were unhappy with one factor of this training element. They were not unhappy with the content, but with the length of time provided for LNT, indicating that they did not have enough time to absorb the lessons taught. Those indicating that they were unhappy said that the LNT module should be extended from 3 months to 7 or 8 months.

 

        

Civics class                                                                           Class debate

 

The third component was 4-months of work-skill training at 31 host training sites throughout Mogadishu City (Enterprise Business Training - EBT). All the participants had previously chosen (more than 90% received their first and the rest received their second choice) which areas they would like to train in and they were then distributed to host training sites based on those preferences. All host trainers were voluntary private businesses. All participants were also required to attend afternoon entrepreneurship classes throughout this period (3 hours per week). Sixty-four percent of the participants indicated that they were happy with this element of the programme. Thirty-six percent of the participants indicated that they were not happy with 1 factor of this element of the programme – the training timeline was too short. All of those who indicated that they were not satisfied with this element of the programme said that the length of time needed to absorb the lessons should be extended from 4 months to 9 months in length.

 

        

Tailoring                                                                               Computer training

 

A final closing ceremony was conducted on 26 July 2004. This ceremony included the public destruction of the 300 weapons. It was conducted at the Ramadan Hotel in Mogadishu; and all sectors of civil and political life in Mogadishu participated in the event (more than 400 people attended the ceremony). The participants themselves took part in destroying the weapons.

 

        

Closing ceremony                                                               Weapon’s being destroyed

 

The delay between the completion of programme and the destruction of the weapons was caused by UNDP’s inability to secure approval from UN-New York to travel to Mogadishu for the ceremony. The reason for their inability to secure travel authority was highlighted by heavy fighting between 2 ‘warlords’ in North Mogadishu in June. The whole programme was conducted without any direct serious incident or accident.

 

Apart from participant criticism over the length of time for each training element the second primary criticism of the programme by the participants was the amount of travel incentive provided. A travel incentive of US$1.30 (US$33.80 per month) was provided to each participant for a 26-day study month. Of those participants that indicated that they were unhappy with the travel incentive provided (69%), they indicated that the average monthly incentive should be increased to US$56.58 per month (or US$2.18 per day for a 26-day month).

 

An exit survey of the host technical trainers was conducted in April 2004. All host trainers indicated that the EBT training period was too short to train the participants to a level of proficiency that would guarantee employment for the participants. The average length of time recommended by the host trainers for the EBT component was 13 months. Though, the host trainers did indicated that they though that 84% of the participants were sufficiently well trained to garner employment.

 

Fifty-eight percent of host trainers indicated that they would like to have had the provision of some money to buy extra tools and equipment so that they could have more effectively taught the participants of the programme.

 

Khaat is a leafy narcotic that is chewed throughout the afternoon, evening and night. It produces euphoria, followed by tiredness and depression. SAACID conducted its LNT element in the afternoons to help break the addiction (particularly prevalent with the militiamen). This had great success, but still, 23% (of 26% of problems noted by host trainers) of the host trainers indicated that they had problems with participants related to khaat. The trainers indicated that problems with this addiction persisted throughout the first three weeks of the EBT element.

 

Three of the 300 participants failed to complete the programme. One was killed in an incident unrelated to the programme, 1 was wounded in an incident unrelated to the programme, and 1 dropped out of the programme. This constitutes a completion rate of 99%.

 

Exit employment opportunities - Fifty-five percent of the participants indicated that they felt positive that their current trainers would keep them on after the programme had been completed. Another 12% of participants said that they were hopeful of continued employment with their current host trainers. This compared to 27% of host trainers who indicated that they would continue to employ their trainees. Twenty-five percent of the host trainers also indicated that they would continue to train their trainees and review their employment status after the further training was completed. The host trainers indicated that they would definitely not hire 48% of the participants. The reasons were a lack of business capacity, or, in some cases, that they were unhappy with the attitude of the participants.

 

Forty percent of the participants indicated that they now had the capacity to start their own business after the completion of the programme. Sixty-four percent of the participants indicated that they believed that they could now find employment with another employer. Ninety-eight percent of participants and 100% of host trainers indicated that access to micro-credit would quantitatively enhance the capacity of the participants to achieve productive employment with the training they received.

 

Of the 150 militiamen represented in the programme, 83.33% indicated that they would categorically not return to militia work, as they had secured sufficient skill to be employed to mainstream society. Another 8% of militiamen indicated that they still had not decided on what to do. They would see if they could get employment, if they could, then they would quit militia work for good. If they couldn’t then they would return to militia work (this group were worried that they had not absorbed enough of the lessons to make them employable). Another 8.67% (13) of the militiamen indicated that they would definitely return to militia work, as they knew that they had not absorbed the lessons learned. They did indicate that if they had more time, and were able to absorb the lessons, that they would give up militia work for a more economically productive alternative.

 

Background

 

After a lengthy insurgency, the Somali government fell in January 1991. The opposition factions were largely clan-based and none had an agenda apart from overthrowing the government of Siad Barre. Egoism and self-interest distorted post-war negotiations amongst faction leaders, with the resultant malaise driving the clan-based factions toward greater distrust and a new civil war.

 

Interventions by ‘Western’ governments and the UN were unsuccessful in attempting to remedy the failed Somali state and civil war bumped along until the heat went out of the conflict in 1996. Despite war-weariness emerging, mistrust, systemic insecurity and deep psychological wounds remained.

 

The results of 20 years of insurrection and fighting have left a terrible toll. The whole country has been looted. No infrastructure remains in any sector. Literally every family can indicate a loved-one who has died because of the various conflicts that have taken place. Millions of Somalis remain displaced or have relocated to other countries. Millions of weapons remain in the hands of individuals and groups, who have no allegiance to the idea of a central Somali state.

 

Since 2000, SAACID has advocated a bottom-up, or grassroots building-block approach to rebuilding peace, social relations and the country. SAACID lobbied for and secured Italian funds for a pilot Demobilisation and Retraining Programme (DRP) in Mogadishu that went through UNESCO in 2001. This programme was very successful and proved that DRP could be done in an ongoing ‘anarchic’ environment. SAACID had lobbied both the Italian Government and UNESCO to also target disarmament as part of the process, but both entities did not believe that it could be done successfully. In 2003, the ILO partnered SAACID in implementing a pilot garbage collection programme in Mogadishu. This sort of programme had been tried previously, but had always failed, because the militias claimed that they ‘owned’ the garbage and wanted money for it to be removed. Again, through a grassroots process of inclusion and transparency, SAACID was able to successfully remove some of the 14 years of garbage from the city (3 month pilot); and in the process, show how some of the distrust between divided communities could be practically addressed.

 

Also in 2003, SAACID and UNDP came together to collaborate on a Demobilisation, Disarmament and Retraining Programme (DDRP) for 300 people in Mogadishu. This time UNDP had the nerve to try for permanent weapons destruction as part of the programme; and for that they should be warmly congratulated. This programme has now been successfully completed – without any incident! All the weapons have been destroyed and divided grassroots communities have again come together to show that they are willing to build a new common future, if the appropriate leadership, management and strategic template are employed.

 

It is SAACID’s position that DDRP can and should be implemented in Somalia – even in an ‘anarchic’ environment – as it can be a powerful tool in the healing process for divided and distrustful communities. Implemented correctly, bottom-up grassroots programming, with strong international partnership, is a sustainable process; and this process can be implemented – each programme building or interacting with the last. A bottom-up approach can be the process through which Somalia can re-build and heal to a point where genuine reintegration can take place. This methodology compares to the decade-long international position of attempting to implement top-down political processes that have little currency or support on the ground; as this sort of process does not address the profound psychological trauma, complete distrust and sense of utter hopelessness felt by virtually all Somalis.

 

Programme description

 

The purpose of the programme was to provide 300 training places for individuals that exchanged a fully functioning automatic weapon for the training, with the understanding that the weapon would be destroyed at the completion of the programme.

 

Six of the 16 districts in Mogadishu were offered 43 training places. The ‘Bermuda’ area of Mogadishu was also included, and was offered 42 training places. One hundred and fifty of the training places went to current militiamen, while the other 150 places went to individuals in mainstream Mogadishu civil society. These 150 places were divided equally between men and women – 75 places each. The districts that were offered the chance for training places in this programme were:

 

 

A 1-month prefatory period would provide time for mobilisation of local community leaders. These leaders would perform the primary selection of candidates and ensure that they conformed to all criteria and agreed to fulfil their contractual obligations – including providing a fully functioning automatic weapon that would be destroyed.

 

The next element of the programme was 3 months on Numeracy and Literacy training (LNT). Also provided was education in health and hygiene, civics, religion (ethics) and counselling to help heal trauma, and to engender a sense of hope in the participants.

 

The final training element involved placing the 300 participants in teaching places with local businesses in Mogadishu (in their home district where possible). All participants were asked to choose what sort of training they wanted; and all participants received their first or second choice. Thirty-one host trainers participated in the programme. The host trainers then provided 4 months of specific skill training for each of the participants (Enterprise Business Training – EBT). Participants were also provided with entrepreneurship training throughout this period, which included training in basic business concepts, and continued training in health and hygiene, civics and counselling.

 

Upon completion of the programme, and with the support of UNDP, all 300 automatic weapons were destroyed in a public closing ceremony.

 

Programme goals

 

 

 

Other goals of the programme included:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Objectives achieved in the programme (outputs)

 

ü      Achieved consensus and cooperation amongst all communities within Mogadishu for an LNT and EBT based programme - through participation of 45 district leaders (including religious leaders, women's leaders, business leaders, NGO leaders, intellectuals, elders, artists, sports leaders and youth leaders) in a 3-day meeting that explained all elements of the programme.

 

ü      Over the course of 1-month, selected 300 candidates for the programme. One hundred and seventy-five of the candidates were free-lance militia. The other 150 candidates were individuals from mainstream Mogadishu civil society. Seventy-five were men and 75 were women. Contracts were signed with each participant, local leaders from the participating districts, a religious leader from each participating district and a parent or guardian for each individual.

 

ü      Over the course of 1-month, collected, photographed, tested and stored 300 automatic weapons that were destroyed at the completion of the training elements.

 

ü      Over the course of 3-months, provided 300 candidates with LNT. This training included education modules in numeracy, literacy, civics and health and hygiene. The candidates also received counselling for the war trauma that the overwhelming majority of Somalis suffer from. The education was implemented at an existing SAACID school site.

 

ü      Over the course of the 3-months of LNT, surveyed and selected existing business enterprises in Mogadishu that would provide appropriate EBT training for the 300 candidates. Contracts were signed with each of these 31 businesses interested in participating in this training exercise as host trainers.

 

ü      Over the course of 1-week, matched and distributed the 300 candidates with their choice for EBT training.

 

ü      Over the course of 4-months, provided EBT training for the 300 candidates. The training was randomly monitored by SAACID on a daily basis. Dispute resolution was conducted by SAACID in partnership with the host trainers, participants and local leaders, parents and guardians of the participants. Travel incentives were paid on a monthly basis to trainees. A training incentive was also provided to each of the host trainers.

 

ü      Provided a closing ceremony for the successful candidates (297) and an extensive and inclusive number of local Mogadishu leaders. This ceremony was widely publicised within Mogadishu, to engender hope within the local population and confidence that programming can be successfully completed with local partners in the current anarchic environment in Mogadishu. All 300 weapons were destroyed publicly at that ceremony. The weapons will now be welded together to form a peace memorial.

 

ü      Provided monthly narrative and photographic reports for the programme.

 

ü      Provided mid-term financial reports.

 

ü      Provided immediate independent field access for any person UNDP nominated.

 

ü      Provided empirical evidence that large-scale employment training programming can be developed and sustained in an anarchic environment, such as that in Mogadishu.

 

ü      Provided empirical evidence that successful and sustainable DDR programming can be implemented in ‘anarchic’ environments, such as Mogadishu.

 

ü      Provided empirical evidence that local Somali partners have the capacity and integrity to implement and sustain 'large-scale' programmes in an ‘anarchic environment’.

 

Prefatory month for programme implementation

 

According to the contract signed with UNDP, the programme was supposed to commence on 1 August 2003. The programme did not begin until 10 August, as no funds from UNDP had been forwarded to SAACID. The funds did not reach SAACID’s bank account until 21 August 2004.

 

A 3-day prefatory workshop was held in SAACID’s compound for 45 local leaders from the 6 participating districts and leaders from the Bermuda area from 12-14 August 2003.

 

 

The workshop provided an explanation of the programme and the criteria necessary to participate. The workshop also covered definitional issues relating to the militia, a review of their habits and psychology and what approach that should be taken to effectively engage them and encourage them to enter the programme.

 

There was also discussion about the surrendering of weapons for destruction and discussion as to why women should be included in the programme.

 

There was good discussion on the division of labour between SAACID and the local leaders to ensure timely and effective implementation of all elements of the programme.

 

The workshop was very successful, with all participants endorsing a common approach to all elements of selection and registration. All agreed in the destruction element of the programme.

 

There was some disquiet that the leaders had to do the mobilisation work voluntarily. Most receive very little income and time away from the activities that provide daily sustenance for their families is very precious. To their credit, the leaders agreed to provide voluntary labour, leadership and management to this pilot programme – especially in the registration phase - to highlight to the international community their commitment to solutions that will help provide peace to the city and the country.

 

The leaders attending the workshop had deep concerns about how the free-lance militias would respond to the criteria outlined in the programme. These concerns proved to be false, with the militias being very keen to engage and take up the training opportunities. The cooperation of the free-lance militias was primarily due to the excellent explanation by local leaders and follow-up discussions by SAACID management.

 

There were also concerns in the workshop about what type of weapons that would be submitted and their quality. In the event, SAACID only had to turn down 6 weapons at the preliminary stage – for not being automatic; and turned down 3 others for non-functionality. All other weapons submitted, while being of below average to average quality, functioned and had the capacity to kill.

 

A virus on one of SAACID’s PC’s destroyed SAACID’s digital photos of this workshop, so the photo evidence provided for this workshop were scans of hard copy photos that were taken at the time.

 

Dozens of meetings occurred between SAACID and local leaders from the participating districts and the Bermuda area. The meetings provided leadership and direction and kept the local leaders on the agreed track for the programme.

 

The Bermuda area proved to be a major hurdle. The first was to convince the participating districts to accept a committee from the Bermuda area. Eventually there was unanimous agreement as to the merits of including the communities residing in this area in the programme as a special group. This area has no formal structure and is badly divided between a myriad of minority sub-clans and factions. SAACID was able to get the disparate communities to agree on a 5-person committee and the division of the area into 3 major working parts. At the beginning of the process this committee was extremely fractious and suspicious of the others. By the end of the registration phase this committee was working together extremely well, with great transparency and good information transfer among members and communities. The choice to include the area has already provided substantial dividends, in terms of providing a practical confidence-building mechanism that has allowed the various communities residing in Bermuda to come closer together, trust each other more and cooperate in practical and constructive ways.

 

Another issue of ongoing debate was the inclusion of women in the training programme. At first the excuse not to include women was that women did not own weapons. SAACID insisted that while women did not directly own weapons, their families did have access to weapons, and as families collectively would decide if a family member would participate in the programme, then it was reasonable to assume that a women could indeed bring a weapon in exchange for the training. The second argument used by leaders was that men were in more need of training. SAACID, as a woman’s NGO, was consistent and persistent in insisting that 25% of the total number of positions should be allocated for women.

 

A third major area of ongoing debate was the type of weapon that could be submitted for the training programme. Again SAACID was consistent and persistent in its message that the weapon had to be fully functional and have an automatic option.

 

These meetings, while time consuming, provided essential management and direction in this crucial phase.

 

The weapon’s registration phase of the prefatory month was conducted between the 4th and 14th of September 2003. SAACID considered this phase to be the most crucial to the success of the programme.

 

 

Each district was given a specific day for their registration of participants and their weapons; and the cantonment of those weapons in SAACID’s inner compound.

 

Hamar-weyne               4 September

Friday holiday               5 September

Karaan                         6 September

Shangani                       7 September

Heliwaa                        8 September

Dharkenley                   9 September

Shibis                           10 September

Bermuda                      11 September

Friday holiday               12 September

 

On average, about 30 of the 43 participants enrolled on their designated day. The others turned up in small groups through the rest of the registration period. Bermuda was given the last day to provide them with more time to organise. The selected committee largely wasted this time and it proved to be a nightmare to get their selected participants on the required day.

 

Thirteen and 14 September was provided as a grace period for registration for the stragglers from the districts and proved to be decisive days in getting the Bermuda group all enrolled. It was extremely difficult to get individuals to come on the required day. The culture is different, with the concept of time not being an important factor in Somalia. Also, it has been more than a decade since Somalis had to discipline themselves to scheduling and it will take time to instil that discipline into the participants.

 

The weapons phase was divided into 5 elements:

 

  1. General introduction and explanation of the process and general Q&A session
  2. Photograph of the participant with their weapon and video interview to ensure the participant knew of why they were bringing their weapon and knew what was going to happen to it. This provided video evidence of their answers in case the participant thought they might be able to back out of the programme at a latter stage. The questions included:

 

·     What is your name?

·     Which district are you from (this proved to be a little tricky, as many participants identified not with a district, but with a sub-district)?

·     How old are you (this proved to be a problem in 13 cases, as the participants were obviously under age. SAACID had to insist that these individuals be replaced by another family member that met the criteria)?

·     Do you own this weapon?

·     Do you freely give this weapon in exchange for training only?

·     Do you understand that this weapon will be destroyed at the end of the training programme?

  1. The completion of ‘fact sheets’ that asked a variety of questions to illicite socio-economic data from the participants and their families.
  2. The firing of weapons to determine the functionality of the weapons that were submitted.
  3. A general discussion of the programme and a point-by-point reading of the contract. This was followed by another Q&A session; and when all was agreed the signing of individual participant contracts.

 

    

Participant number 18                             Checking weapons for functionality

 

1.                              General Introduction

 

This element was designed to set the potential participants at ease and get them to embrace the programme at the earliest possible stage.

 

2.                              Photo and Video Evidence

 

The photo identified the individual with their weapon. Each weapon was numbered from 001-300. This provided photographic evidence to UNDP that SAACID had indeed successfully selected 300 participants; and each participant had indeed contributed a weapon for the training.

 

The video interview provided further proof that 300 individuals had indeed been enrolled; and also provided documentary back-up that all individuals handed in their weapon voluntarily and was aware that the weapon would be destroyed at the end of the programme.

 

3.                              Fact Sheet

 

The fact sheet was designed to glean more information about the individual and their family (see model fact sheet; see photos). Questions included their preference for training and what work experience they had. The fact sheets also collected the registration number for each rifle. At a later stage the identification number of each rifle was again checked and all were tabulated onto a spreadsheet. SAACID correlated the data from these sheets and provided that data to UNDP in a tabulated form. Each participant was also required to provide 2 passport size photographs for the fact sheet. The original stayed with SAACID in case of any problems; while the second went to UNDP for their reference. This photo and fact sheet data also provided yet another layer of proof of the 300 participants and their backgrounds.

 

4.            Weapon Firing

 

This element was designed to provide proof to SAACID and UNDP that all weapons were indeed functional and operational (see videos provided to UNDP).

 

SAACID insisted that each participant bring 3 bullets to be fired. This was because of the high incidence of akaro ammunition in Mogadishu. Akaro ammunition is locally made and is of extremely poor quality. SAACID hoped that by insisting on three bullets one of those bullets would fire. SAACID did ask all participants to bring genuine ammunition to be fired, but knew that this would be almost totally ignored.

 

On the first day of the registration process (Hamar-weyne) safety and fire procedures were extremely deficient and were inherently dangerous.

 

In one incident an unauthorised discharge occurred in the compound during the photo and video element.

 

In the firing of each weapon, all participants were encouraged to watch their own weapon being fired. This was to stop accusations from participants that the weapon was working before, so SAACID must have damaged the weapon. With so many people present at the firing – particularly freelance militia who all wanted to show their manhood – several dangerous incidents occurred where the participants fired their own weapons instead of the designated SAACID weapon specialists.

 

Many of the weapons throughout the testing process showed tight actions (indicating long periods of storage). There were also many bullet jams and misfires due to the poor quality of the akaro ammunition supplied by the participants.

 

After the first day of testing weapons SAACID’s safety and fire control procedures were completely rewritten. From that point all weapons entering the compound were to be unloaded. Any person found with ammunition in their rifle would be immediately expelled from the programme. This proved to be very successful, as there were no further incidents with loaded weapon in the compound.

 

As for the test firing of weapons, all participants were banned from the firing area. Their district leaders acted as observers for the firing. If there was a problem the participants were called, told of the problem and asked to fix the problem. Most problems revolved around poor weapon maintenance or poor quality ammunition.

 

SAACID’s fire control procedures were very successful from the second day on, with a much larger degree of safety being maintained. The only other real threat from the firing was that a mosque was close to the firing area and inevitably the firing took place at about the time of lunch prayer, so there was a small stream of worshipers moving past the firing area on several of the other days of registration. As each day passed SAACID was able to refine the firing process a little further.

 

All but three of the weapons fired at least one bullet successfully (see videos provided to UNDP). The participants exchanged those weapons that had manifest problems and new functional weapons were submitted.

 

As the registration process went on the participants became aware that SAACID wanted to see that the weapon fired only one bullet successfully. Participants then brought only 2 or 1 bullets for the test firing – but still bought akaro ammunition. This meant that there were further delays, as the ammunition would not fire and then the participants were told to go away and find good quality ammunition.

 

On a scale of 1-7 nearly all weapons fell into the 3-4 category – ‘below average’ to ‘average’. Most weapons suffered from poor maintenance (lack of oil) and from extended periods of storage. With a little oil and decent ammunition though, the weapons handed in proved to be as lethal as any of the latest models in the weapon markets.

 

Most weapons submitted were Stirling Assault Rifles, light machine guns (USSR RPD types) and M16’s (see photo evidence provided to UNDP for each weapon). As the price of ammunition for these rifles is very expensive, these rifles are relatively cheap on the local market and are considered to be ‘expendable’ by families doing a cost-benefit analysis. The light machineguns handed in are of an older and heavier type to the new ones available on the market and so are also considered to be an ‘expendable’ commodity by families, which are seen as useful in exchange for educational and vocational training.

 

5.            Contract Signing

 

While the relevant district leaders were observing the weapon firing all the participants were being given a summary of the programme and a point-by-point reading of the contract. There was then a Q&A session to answer all outstanding questioning and concerns. If concerns still remained, when the weapon firing was completed the local leaders returned to the briefing room and further discussion took place. Once all concerns were fully met each participant was asked to voluntarily sign their contract (see model contract and photos provided to UNDP).

 

Each contract had 5 signatures affixed:

 

·     The participant

·     SAACID – Somalia management committee member

·     District Commissioner of the relative district

·     Local religious leader

·     Parent or guardian of the participant

 

Four independent signatures insured that the contract is valid in any Sharia court. SAACID layered the whole registration process to ensure the maximum guarantee possible that participants accepting entry to the programme had no chance of exiting the programme at a later stage with their weapon.

 

        

Contract signing                                                 District leaders observe weapon’s testing

 

The layered approach to responsibility also assured a large degree of community participation and responsibility in the programme. It would be shameful for a district to recommend a participant who then caused problems. If problems did arise, the local community was then responsible for censoring and disciplining the participant and talking to the family of the participant. This participatory approach to programming is seen by SAACID as integral to the success of the programme.

 

It was a constant battle to get the districts to fill their quota of women for the training. They constantly turned up for the registration process with mostly men. This was despite prior consultations and agreements to fill their quota of women. Inevitable delays and discussions occurred each day as local leaders were told that if they did not fill their quota of women they would not be participating in the programme. Then there were the heated discussions with the men they had selected and lots had to be drawn to see who would miss out and have to bring a female member of the family to participate.

 

This was extremely time consuming and only dogged persistence saw SAACID reach the quota of 25% women. SAACID sees this as a real achievement for Somali women in the most difficult of programmes to achieve such a quota.

 

There was a notable difference in how the freelance militia behaved in a classroom setting compared to the previous DRP conducted in partnership with UNESCO. SAACID puts this down to the presence of women and non-combatant men in the training mix of participants. SAACID recommends that this be duly noted for any other such programming done in the Somali context.

 

School registration on 15 September at the SAACID Primary and Secondary School in the district of Shibis was designated by SAACID as the first day of the LNT education programme. Participants were paid their travel incentive effective from this date.

 

LNT registration day

 

All but 16 of the participants turned up for registration (94.67%) on that first day. This was an outstanding achievement, which went to good communication and excellent mobilisation on the part of the local district leaders.

 

The common entrance examination was conducted on 16 September at SAACID’s Shibis school. The grading of examination papers took place on 17 and 18 September. This exam evaluated the current education level of the participants, and provided the baseline data to divide the participants into classes based on education level. All the LNT teachers had a university undergraduate degree or better.

 

During these two days the participants were kept in general classes designated by district. There were introductions to all subjects to be covered during the course of the LNT element. Discipline was maintained from the beginning – especially for the militia.

 

Friday 19 September was a standard Muslim holiday. Graded classes began on 20 September. Books and pencils were provided to each participant by SAACID.

 

On 19 September, there was an incident that involved participant 209. She was wounded in an unrelated incident to the programme; and it was agreed by all parties that another woman should replace her.

 

The formal opening ceremony for the programme was conduced on 5 October. There were 60 invited guests, including the Governor of the Benadir Region, UNDP representatives, an EU representative, a WFP representative, The Deputy chairman of the Somali Olympic Committee, representatives of local NGO’s – including Peaceline and SOCDA, and the District Commissioners involved in the programme, religious leaders, artists, media services and the District leaders of Bondhere and Abdul-aziz.

 

Opening ceremony

 

3-month numeracy and literacy training (LNT) element

 

Syllabi were prepared for literacy (Somali), maths, civics, counselling and health and hygiene. They were designed for a 3-month programme. Classes in religion (ethics) and physical education were also scheduled.

 

Classes were conducted 6 days per week (Friday being the standard Muslim holiday) for 3.75 hours each day – from 1:45 pm to 5:45 pm. Each day the participant received lessons in 5 classes of 45 minutes each. A total of 97.5 hours of formal lessons were conducted for each participant.

 

Exams were conducted for each subject on a monthly basis. Specialist teaching staff prepared the exams and copies of these exams were sent to UNDP as a reference. Results of all exams were also sent to UNDP as part of monthly reports.

 

The first travel incentive payment was completed on 16 October. This payment process was conducted without any incidents or accidents. The travel incentive was paid monthly and was conducted throughout the LNT element without incident.

 

 

Participants were only paid for days that they were present. This encouraged participants – particularly the militia who were largely addicted to khaat, and who would normally be ‘chewing’ at this time – to attend classes. This was the first step in getting these individuals to break the khaat habit.

 

During this period, SAACID completed an assessment of which skills were available and marketable in the current context in Mogadishu. The results which came out were 12 skills and are as follows:

 

·        Auto mechanic

·        Auto electric

·        Auto body work (panel beater)

·        Auto painting

·        Auxiliary nurse

·        Tailoring

·        Carpentry

·        Welding

·        Electrician

·        Fishery

·        Motor winding

·        Administration

 

Also during the LNT period, businesses were lobbied and consulted to see who was interested in becoming a host trainer – and to evaluate who had the capacity to fulfil the criteria to be a host trainer.

 

A 1-day meeting between SAACID and the selected 31 host trainers took place on 19 December. All aspects of the Enterprise Business Training (EBT) element were discussed. A model contract for the host trainers was circulated and discussed; and then signed.

 

 

A soccer competition was organised for the participants again students enrolled at SAACID schools and was conducted in the month of November.

 

A 1-day first aid and general knowledge health and hygiene competition was implemented in December. The competition helped develop competition between classes – and this created new allegiances between individuals of different districts. The event exceeded expectations – highlighting the level of lessons learned; and the level of positive interaction between individuals of different districts that have been divided for a long time.

 

Formal monthly meetings were held with the local leaders of the participating districts. All aspects of the programme were discussed and SAACID continually attempted to develop local capacity for problem solving. It was evident that as the programme developed so did the trust between the leaders of these divided districts. Meetings were held as necessary to provide solutions to any problems that arose.

 

Visitors to the school during this period included representatives of UNDP and 2 Japanese reporters.

 

The mid-term financial report (November) was completed and forwarded to UNDP.

 

Monthly narrative reports and photographic summaries were forwarded to UNDP. Constant email communication with UNDP was also undertaken to provide regular updates.

 

4-month enterprise business training (EBT) element

 

Participants were provided with 4-months of skill training in 31 host training sites in Mogadishu. Participants were able to indicate their choices for the area of training that they wanted to do. More than 90% of the participants received their first choice; with the rest of the participants receiving their second choice.

 

Each participant was also provided with 1 day a week of entrepreneurship training (3 hours per week - 48 hours total). This training included continued lessons in health and hygiene, civics and counselling for trauma, as well as modules in basic business principles. These classes were designed to help engender in the participants a sense of self-belief that would enable them to be more confident in looking for productive employment, or starting their own business after the completion of the programme.

 

        

Motor mechanics                                                                 Final entrepreneurship exam

 

The distribution of the participants to their individual host training sites was conducted over 2 days, from 19-21 December.

 

SAACID monitors randomly checked the training sites on a constant basis. In the first month of the EBT there were a number of incidents occurring between the host trainers and the participants. These related to:

 

 

These problems were worked through with SAACID staff, the host trainers and district leaders, parents and guardians. By the end of the first month these problems were largely solved and the following months proceeded relatively smoothly.

 

Twenty community representatives from the 6 participating districts and the Bermuda area were invited to inspect each of the training sites in December 2003. The community representatives noted their appreciation of the programme and gave their best wishes to UNDP for supporting the initiative.

 

Participant number 278, from the Bermuda area, dropped out of the programme in the first week of January 2004. The explanation given by his family was that he had left the country to seek further educational opportunities. As it was late in the programme, this participant was not replaced.

 

Participants 289 and 229 were wounded in separate and unrelated incidents to the programme. The wounds of participant 289 were considered only moderate, and he was allowed to continue in the programme. The wounds of participant 229 were considered too severe for him to continue (a shattered hip amongst other injuries). As it was late in the programme, this participant was not replaced.

 

Participant 184 was killed in an unrelated incident on 5 April 2004. As the programme was near completion, he was not replaced in the programme.

 

The monthly payment of travel incentives for this 4-month element passed without any incident.

 

Training incentive payments were paid monthly to the host trainers. These payments were made without any incident throughout the 4 months of EBT programming.

 

Monthly narrative reports and photographic summaries were provided to UNDP as evidence of continued programming. Constant email communication with UNDP was also undertaken to provide regular updates.

 

A mid-term financial report was submitted to UNDP in January (with all original documentation attached).

 

SAACID provided funds for 25 administration trainees to take on a 1-month computer course (15 March – 14 April 2004) with a private company.

 

Visitors to the programme during this element included UNDP security officers (17 February).

 

 

A meeting was called on 14 April for all host trainers to discuss the programme and share lessons learned from the programme. The conclusions of this meeting included:

 

 

A peace and demobilisation workshop for DDRP was conducted by SAACID at its administration centre in Abdul-aziz for 40 leaders from Karaan and Heliwaa (23-25 March). The purpose of the orientation work was to synthesize community support in each district on importance of peace, and how disarmament and demobilization could contribute to the stability of the respective districts of Mogadishu and the development of a larger integrated DDRP process for all Mogadishu. This workshop gave the participants the opportunity insight and understanding of what had gone on in the programme. This example of transparency is the sort of add-on activity that can engender a great deal of trust, understanding and ownership amongst communities that have been divided for decades. The leaders at this workshop praised all involved in the programme – including long-time adversaries. Their one real concern was the sustainability of any large-scale DDRP in the city. SAACID agreed with their analysis, indicating that any large-scale intervention would necessarily need supporting micro-credit to ensure that most of the participants became sustainably employed.

 

A peace and demobilisation workshop for DDRP was conducted by SAACID at its administration centre in Abdul-aziz for 60 leaders from Shibis, Hamar-weyne and Shingani (7-9 April). The purpose of the orientation work was to synthesize community support in each district on importance of peace, and how disarmament and demobilization could contribute to the stability of the respective districts of Mogadishu and the development of a larger integrated DDRP process for all Mogadishu. The participants discussed the impact of the LNT courses, host–training workshops and the EBT courses on the trainees and how reintegration of the youth back into society, which they had been ostracised from for many long years. In general, the communities felt that the demobilization programme had contributed in building up solid ground for strengthening the overall stability and averting widespread freelance looting incidents in Mogadishu.

 

Following the implementation of the eight-month long demobilisation programme, the participants considered the need to extend and expand the activities of the DDRP, so as to demobilise additional militia, and to give space for political and civic leaders to develop and enforce an environment of law and order for the city and the country. The main objective of the demobilisation programme was to demobilise, rehabilitate and reintegrate the militia back into society and to build a better future for them by providing them with appropriate income generation skills. The leaders commended UNDP and SAACID, saying that both organisations had gained credibility and praise for the efforts in the demobilisation programme.

 

An Obstacles to DDRP workshop was organised by SAACID on 5-7 April for 45 community leaders from the districts participating in the programme. Obstacles highlighted included:

 

 

These obstacles were overcome by:

 

 

Thiry-two community representatives from the 6 participating districts and the Bermuda area visited the 31 host training sites from 17-19 March 2004. The purpose of the visit was to make the training process more transparent and to engender community support and ownership. This event had the desired result, with community leaders embracing the process and calling for an expansion of the programme as a means of solving conflict within Mogadishu.

 

An exit survey for all participants was conducted during the last week of the programme in April (see survey previously provided to UNDP).

 

An exit survey for all host trainers was conducted during the last week of the programme in April (see survey previously provided to UNDP).

 

Closing ceremony and weapons